{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-93280",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-93280"
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-24T15:54:02Z",
  "summary": "greybus: audio: bound the topology section sizes against the fetched size",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngreybus: audio: bound the topology section sizes against the fetched size\n\ngb_audio_gb_get_topology() fetches a topology blob of a module-supplied\nsize, and gbaudio_tplg_parse_data() then walks it by adding the\nmodule-supplied size_dais, size_controls and size_widgets fields to\nform the control, widget and route section offsets. Those le32 sizes\nare never checked against the fetched blob, so a module reporting a\nsmall topology size but large section sizes makes the offsets point\npast the allocation, and parsing reads out of bounds.\n\nReject a topology whose section sizes do not fit within the fetched\nsize before it is parsed.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.188",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-93280"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba86de9f7b0d7903d2df5ea2373e34d8ca3fc43e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd5593aee0a0fb353e1164aff7b65e563fe1f232"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f764363b3173d805be11e59a8f23ecee2d420d5"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52daf9de692ebac813d110eb1e677dc0e1f4a5ab"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0f6eaba60705bacd9bb4ce48eab50ef3f546777"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9191f2e2f35f1209eb2dc24b31129dd47b48c16"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfcc5a41a9664eb68023aae4cd0d485b256bd7c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33d8c7b794d2a30637c9d3fcb478f1d3222bef1e"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-09-25T05:22:58Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:A - The malformed bytes are size_dais/size_controls/size_widgets in the GB_AUDIO_TYPE_GET_TOPOLOGY response that gb_audio_probe() fetches via gb_audio_gb_get_topology()\u2192gb_operation_sync(); on BeaglePlay that Greybus payload is delivered by hdlc_rx_greybus_frame() from the CC1352 802.15.4 SVC, so a radio-range module supplies the blob, not a routable IP peer.\nAC:L - A module that returns a small GET_TOPOLOGY_SIZE and then oversized le32 size_* fields makes gbaudio_tplg_process_header() compute control_offset/widget_offset past the kzalloc() blob on every gb_audio_probe(); the attacker fully controls those fields and no race or uninfluenced host state is required.\nPR:N - gb_svc_process_module_inserted()\u2192gb_module_add()\u2192gb_interface_enable()\u2192greybus_probe()\u2192gb_audio_probe() runs with no capable() or host-uid check, and CAP authentication is a separate optional ioctl, not a gate on this path; the attacking module needs no Linux account.\nUI:N - gb_audio_probe() itself calls gb_audio_gb_get_topology() and gbaudio_tplg_parse_data() as soon as a GREYBUS_CLASS_AUDIO bundle is registered; no victim ioctl, ALSA open, or mount is required.\nS:U - The over-read and snprintf() stores corrupt the host kernel topology allocation and adjacent slab inside the same kernel authority; this is not a KVM/Xen guest-to-host escape or an IOMMU/DMA bypass.\nC:H - gbaudio_tplg_process_kcontrols() and gbaudio_tplg_create_widget() read gb_audio_control/widget fields from the OOB offset, and gb_generate_enum_strings() walks names with an unbounded while (*data != '\\0') past the blob, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (and those strings can later appear as ALSA enum names).\nI:H - With curr/w pointing past the topology object, snprintf(curr->name, sizeof(curr->name), \"GB %d %s\", ...) in gbaudio_tplg_process_kcontrols() and snprintf(w->name, ...) in gbaudio_tplg_create_widget() perform 32-byte out-of-bounds writes at an attacker-chosen size_dais+size_controls offset, a heap write primitive.\nA:H - Walking those OOB control/widget pointers and the unbounded enum-name scan can fault on an unmapped page during gb_audio_probe() and oops the kernel; the module can re-insert to repeat it."
    }
  }
}