{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-90357",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-90357"
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-17T16:10:40Z",
  "summary": "wifi: mt76: mt7915: unlink TWT flow if the MCU rejects the agreement",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mt76: mt7915: unlink TWT flow if the MCU rejects the agreement\n\nThe flow is added to dev->twt_list before sending the agreement to the\nfirmware, but the error path leaves it linked while flowid_mask is\nnever set. The flow slot can then be reused and memset while still on\nthe list, corrupting twt_list, and station removal leaves a dangling\nentry behind that mt7915_mac_twt_sched_list_add() later walks.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.188",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-90357"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c09d1b15ed2dc49060303b16a296b7b8b7794cbe"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bd5c4ed2b9045faf83315c54cd37a9b7c71b5c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cabe239e95b4eebf5b6c3654087b66ff9425bc7b"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bce0f1280c94af8314f895f404629da09f0788c"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/beaa42b875965dbc3e80e46970e0bfa60a94c2db"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16a04441eab0dcd4d7126a6f66b370adbf28f96d"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-09-18T17:55:42Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:A - WLAN_S1G_TWT_SETUP action frames carry the TWT element into ieee80211_rx_h_action \u2192 ieee80211_process_rx_twt_action \u2192 ieee80211_s1g_rx_twt_setup \u2192 drv_add_twt_setup \u2192 mt7915_mac_add_twt_setup; the triggering bytes arrive over 802.11 radio on the AP\u2019s LAN segment, so the vector is Adjacent.\nAC:L - After mt7915_mcu_twt_agrt_update(..., MCU_TWT_AGRT_ADD) fails, a second TWT setup from the same STA does memset/INIT_LIST_HEAD on the still-linked msta->twt.flow[] slot because flowid_mask was never set. The attacker induces that ADD failure (MCU timeout or mt76_dma_tx_queue_skb_raw queue-full) with their own traffic, then retries or deauths; not a victim-only race.\nPR:N - ieee80211_process_rx_twt_action only requires rx->sta on an AP with twt_responder; WLAN_CATEGORY_S1G TWT frames are not robust management frames, so MFP does not gate them. No Linux account or capability is needed: associating as a client to an open or guest mt7915 AP is enough to send the TWT setup.\nUI:N - The attacker sends the TWT Setup action frame and the follow-up retry or deauth; ieee80211_iface_work \u2192 ieee80211_s1g_rx_twt_action runs with no local user step. An already-running AP with twt_responder is standing configuration, not victim interaction during the attack.\nS:U - mt7915_mac_add_twt_setup corrupts the host kernel\u2019s dev->twt_list and the mt7915_twt_flow embedded in sta->drv_priv; impact stays inside that kernel security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or guest-to-host boundary.\nC:H - On DISASSOC, mt7915_mac_twt_teardown_flow returns immediately when flowid_mask is unset, then sta_info_free kfree\u2019s the sta while the node remains on twt_list. A later mt7915_mac_twt_sched_list_add walk reads the freed mt7915_twt_flow, a use-after-free of attacker-reallocatable sta slab.\nI:H - The retry path memset/INIT_LIST_HEAD of a still-linked flow, and list_add in mt7915_mac_twt_sched_list_add, write next/prev through corrupted or freed list nodes, yielding a kernel write primitive from list corruption and the DISASSOC use-after-free.\nA:H - mt7915_mac_twt_sched_list_add walking the corrupted or dangling twt_list oopses on a freed mt7915_twt_flow or spins forever on a self-linked node after INIT_LIST_HEAD, hanging or panicking the AP kernel."
    }
  }
}