{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-89846", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2026-89846" ], "published": "2026-09-16T10:32:03Z", "summary": "scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read\n\nIn qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and\nshrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:\n\n\tif (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) {\n\t\tsense_data += rsp_info_len;\n\t\tpar_sense_len -= rsp_info_len;\n\t}\n\nrsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP\nresponse (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area\nsize (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target\nreporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned\nsubtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of\nbounds.\n\nThe underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in\nqla2x00_handle_sense():\n\n\tif (sense_len > par_sense_len)\n\t\tsense_len = par_sense_len;\n\tmemcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);\n\nso the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the\nout-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap\nmemory into the command's sense buffer.\n\nClamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so\npar_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB\ndata area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both\nqla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": { "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e", "upstream_version": "6.1.47", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.1.188", "compiled_filter": false } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89846" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e57ace988bda5693f7b3645f652ea4b4220870ee" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b08c0cb110a1fba92f99d655020198489699815" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be75ab791c9b3baca66c70ce03443afebc83acda" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebc41dfc59d190956e0113e8bd90c28f6f21e8b9" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7f7746ff031ae45724881261804f4bf5317c985" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6e8977bce887481b2b2b0e2e14a791270741cfb" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca6d880d6c70cb7946e7b3e05d7285f271b6d99e" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-09-16T14:40:32Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 9.1, "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical", "scenario": "AV:N - qla2xxx builds initiator status IOCBs from a remote Fibre Channel or FCoE target's FCP_RSP; QLogic CNAs speak FCoE and SAN fabrics are stretched across sites via FCIP/inter-fabric routing, so a malicious or compromised target delivers the crafted rsp_data_len over the storage network with no local access.\nAC:L - A hostile target fully controls FCP_RSP (SS_RESPONSE_INFO_LEN_VALID, rsp_data_len, sense_len, CHECK CONDITION, rsp_info[3]==0) and can return them on ordinary initiator I/O such as INQUIRY during fabric scan; no race, rare config, or victim state beyond a FWI2-capable HBA is required.\nPR:N - Completions are handled in the HBA interrupt/response-queue path (qla24xx_process_response_queue to qla2x00_status_entry) with no Linux credential or capability check; the attacker only needs to act as an FC/FCoE target on the fabric.\nUI:N - Once the target is visible on the fabric, the SCSI midlayer automatically issues commands (scan, path checks, mounted-filesystem I/O) whose STATUS_TYPE completions take the vulnerable path; no user mount, open, or other interactive step is required at exploit time.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and any resulting oops stay inside the host kernel that owns the qla2xxx driver and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other separate security authority.\nC:H - Attacker-controlled 32-bit rsp_info_len advances sense_data out of the 28-byte IOCB data area and underflows par_sense_len so qla2x00_handle_sense() copies up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE (96) bytes of adjacent response-ring or kernel memory into the command sense buffer, which userspace can read via SCSI completion, SG_IO, and BSG.\nI:N - The memcpy destination is the in-bounds SCSI sense buffer already capped at SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE; this is a source over-read only, with no out-of-bounds write, use-after-free, or control-flow hijack primitive.\nA:H - Adding a 32-bit attacker-chosen rsp_info_len to sense_data yields a wild kernel pointer; memcpy from an unmapped address in the interrupt-context response-queue path oopses or panics the host, and the target can repeat this on every command." } } }