{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-89720", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2026-89720" ], "published": "2026-09-11T19:47:07Z", "summary": "ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check\n\nubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field\nbefore handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the\ncheck has the wrong sign:\n\n\tif (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))\n\nThe signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,\n64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most\n\n\tsnod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)\n\nbytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a\ndeclared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually\nholds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).\nverify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()\nis then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while\nwalking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted\nimage, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via\nubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.\n\nsnod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner\n(c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected\nsubtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a\ncorrect superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is\nembedded in.", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": { "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e", "upstream_version": "6.1.47", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.1.188", "compiled_filter": false } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89720" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab7405bd86331cc2dbc8201699d4adc33bea75e7" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11abc34698cb3172badf8aa12e623f1bac98bbd8" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8cc3da72cf57acb4b77442ea8cec48425dff7c06" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37a9d25a563f5f9103282954ce573c4a61321e7c" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f76b79d6e42af20682495bccd22f72c7164b0018" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1dc246f98bb94233effa4fa3ec7bf84700bb7d1" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83e1aa9f5f906c9b1f4949d0521f0f950a159d96" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95d27c1708bb6e8823c8e7c623f9abc2a91bf4bf" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-09-14T12:06:03Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 7.7, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:L - The OOB read is reached only while mounting a local UBIFS/UBI volume (mount \u2192 ubifs_fill_super \u2192 mount_ubifs \u2192 ubifs_read_superblock \u2192 authenticate_sb_node \u2192 ubifs_sb_verify_signature). The inflated ubifs_sig_node->len comes from on-disk flash, not ksmbd, nfsd, or any received-packet path.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls the on-disk SIG node size and signode->len. The inverted check accepts a payload up to snod->len+64; with a node filling the LEB that deterministically reads 128 bytes past vmalloc'd c->sbuf in asn1_ber_decoder(), with no race or uncontrolled layout.\nPR:N - Supplying the crafted authenticated image needs no account on the victim. ubifs_fs_type lacks FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so the CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount (boot-time auth_key mount on embedded, automotive, and IoT devices that use offline-signed UBIFS) is performed by the platform, matching the malicious-filesystem model.\nUI:N - Offline-signed UBIFS is verified automatically at mount; boot/fstab auto-mount with auth_key runs ubifs_sb_verify_signature in ubifs_read_superblock before any file access, so planting or presenting the crafted volume is sufficient with no separate victim click or open.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and any oops remain inside the mounting host kernel. This is a same-authority memory-safety issue, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-boundary impact.\nC:H - verify_pkcs7_signature() \u2192 pkcs7_parse_message() \u2192 asn1_ber_decoder() walks an attacker-inflated length of up to 128 bytes past c->sbuf (vmalloc of the LEB). That is an out-of-bounds kernel read of adjacent vmalloc memory, which is Confidentiality High rather than a few-byte leak.\nI:N - The defect is an out-of-bounds read of PKCS#7/ASN.1 headers; the decoder copies those bytes only into newly allocated parse objects sized from the claimed length and does not write past any allocation or provide an arbitrary-write or control-flow primitive.\nA:H - Reading past the vmalloc LEB buffer into an unmapped vmalloc guard page oopses or panics the kernel during mount, and a crafted image can retrigger that crash on every boot or mount of the volume." } } }