{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-89686",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-89686"
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-11T19:47:07Z",
  "summary": "nfsd: fix BUG_ON in nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid on racing delegation revoke",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: fix BUG_ON in nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid on racing delegation revoke\n\nnfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid reads fp->fi_deleg_file without holding\nfi_lock when the parent stateid is a delegation. A concurrent delegation\nrevoke via the laundromat can clear fi_deleg_file under fi_lock, causing\nnfsd_file_get() to return NULL and triggering the BUG_ON.\n\nThis race is client-reachable: two NFS clients can trigger it by having\none hold a delegation while another opens the same file to force a\nrecall. When the first client doesn't respond to the recall, the\nlaundromat revokes it. A concurrent LAYOUTGET from any client using the\ndelegation stateid hits the race window.\n\nFix this by taking fi_lock around the fi_deleg_file read in the\nSC_TYPE_DELEG path, matching the locking discipline of the\nfind_any_file() arm, and replacing the BUG_ON with a graceful error\nreturn that cleans up the partially-initialized layout stateid.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89686"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c517f27498757e616d2a8fe6d16caad1fee422e6"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/607a56fea772c1f4f4989d8e255dd4f7192d9604"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97bda8b4284d90897a1f1922e5082ff9e35d7c7e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca94ba36172046be6a694a7986f6931e47ed4d51"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-09-13T06:49:25Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - The flaw is in nfsd pNFS LAYOUTGET (nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid in fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c). A remote NFSv4.1 client reaches it over TCP/2049 via nfsd_dispatch to nfsd4_proc_compound to nfsd4_layoutget, so no local access to the NFS server is required.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race: one NFS client obtains a delegation while another OPENs the same file to force recall, then the first client withholds CB_RECALL and issues concurrent LAYOUTGET with the delegation stateid as the laundromat runs put_deleg_file. The sequence is retryable and can be timed using FATTR4_LEASE_TIME.\nPR:N - Typical nfsd deployments accept AUTH_SYS/AUTH_NULL without cryptographic authentication. Any host allowed by the export ACL can EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION, OPEN to receive a delegation, and LAYOUTGET; no local account or capability on the NFS server is required.\nUI:N - The attacking NFS clients drive the OPEN, recall, and LAYOUTGET compounds themselves against an already-running nfsd export. No victim user action such as mounting a filesystem or opening a file on the server is required.\nS:U - The unlocked fi_deleg_file load and resulting BUG_ON or nfsd_file use-after-free occur in kernel nfsd state on the NFS server host. Impact stays in that kernel security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\nC:H - put_deleg_file may drop the last nfsd_file ref and call_rcu-free it (KMEM_CACHE flags 0, not SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) while LAYOUTGET still calls nfsd_file_get on the stale pointer. After slab reuse the layout stateid's nf_file can be leveraged for kernel information disclosure.\nI:H - The same stale nfsd_file pointer is used for refcount_inc_not_zero and later nfsd4_layout_setlease/kernel_setlease on nf_file. Heap reuse of the nfsd_file slab enables an arbitrary write or control-flow hijack per kernel UAF scoring guidance.\nA:H - When nfsd_file_get returns NULL the original code hits BUG_ON(!ls->ls_file), oopsing or panicking the nfsd thread. Even without that assertion, use-after-free of nfsd_file crashes nfsd, and the attacker can repeat LAYOUTGET to deny NFS service."
    }
  }
}