{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-89497",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-89497"
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-11T19:47:07Z",
  "summary": "orangefs: skip leading spaces before parsing client debug masks",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\norangefs: skip leading spaces before parsing client debug masks\n\norangefs_prepare_cdm_array() sizes each client debug keyword buffer\nwith strcspn(cds_head, \" \"), but then parses the keyword with %s. The\n%s conversion skips leading whitespace, while strcspn() does not.\n\nIf a client debug entry starts with a space, the allocation can be sized\nfor an empty keyword while sscanf() copies the following non-empty token.\nThis can write past the end of the allocated keyword buffer.\n\nSkip leading spaces before computing the keyword length so the allocation\nmatches the string parsed by sscanf().",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.188",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89497"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/173bfd69696815bcf1c052f61cb69c26cca4e443"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/995f4d05589f87452a56672270af28918c8939c3"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ef38d53bca5ea1375fea0d3d11e9727df064b85"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce748ae1181d0daf5dd0d2d906d5c1cc328c153b"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15d79c806231e62a7b746d3b42626810004e1b27"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/116d14f29a0524853c9316f32a2ac06cff5d4bf6"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1774c5b3713add32fe15ab0d3db4b73355f94e35"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d410cd5303ec59c7cf23dd61423752ce8e9ecb59"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-09-14T12:06:03Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The overflow is reached only via ioctl(ORANGEFS_DEV_CLIENT_STRING) on /dev/pvfs2-req after orangefs_devreq_open(); orangefs_debugfs_new_client_string() copy_from_user()s the client debug-mask table from that local fd into orangefs_prepare_cdm_array(). Unlike readdir trailers, this string is not supplied by an OrangeFS server over the network.\nAC:L - A single CLIENT_STRING ioctl whose first newline-delimited entry begins with spaces then a long non-whitespace token deterministically makes strcspn() return 0 while sscanf(\"%s\") copies that token; the attacker fully controls the 2048-byte buffer and needs no race, heap layout, or other state outside their control.\nPR:L - orangefs_devreq_open() checks only init_user_ns, O_NONBLOCK, and exclusive open\u2014no capability. The kernel documents mknod /dev/pvfs2-req, which is typically world-readable, and ioctl works on O_RDONLY, so an unprivileged local user can open the node when client-core is not holding it; user namespaces cannot open it, but init-ns DAC is enough.\nUI:N - The attacker opens /dev/pvfs2-req and issues the crafted CLIENT_STRING ioctl themselves. No victim must mount OrangeFS, start pvfs2-client-core, or otherwise interact; an already-loaded module and device node are deployment state, not user interaction.\nS:U - The heap overflow and any resulting kernel memory corruption or oops occur in the same kernel that services the ioctl. This is a standard local kernel compromise, not a VM/IOMMU/sandbox boundary crossing.\nC:H - sscanf(\"%s\") with no field width copies an attacker-chosen token (up to the 2048-byte ioctl buffer) into a kzalloc(1) keyword, a large heap overflow that can overwrite adjacent slab objects and pointers, yielding an arbitrary read primitive per CNA memory-corruption guidance.\nI:H - The same unbounded out-of-bounds write smashes heap metadata and neighboring objects with attacker-controlled bytes, which is sufficient for arbitrary write and control-flow hijack; CNA guidance rates heap buffer overflows High for integrity.\nA:H - Overflowing a 1-byte slab allocation by up to ~2KB of attacker data reliably corrupts the heap and can oops/panic the kernel even without a full exploit, so availability impact is High."
    }
  }
}