{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-80980",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80980"
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-11T19:47:07Z",
  "summary": "net/smc: stop killed, freed and out_of_sync sharing a byte",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: stop killed, freed and out_of_sync sharing a byte\n\nThe three connection state flags are single-bit bitfields, so they occupy\none byte of struct smc_connection and every store to one is a\nread-modify-write of the other two:\n\n    u8  killed : 1;\n    u8  freed : 1;\n    u8  out_of_sync : 1;\n\nThey are not written under a common lock. smc_cdc_msg_validate() sets\nout_of_sync from the receive tasklet, while smc_conn_kill() sets killed\nfrom process context under lock_sock(), and the receive path does not defer\nto the backlog when the socket is owned -- smc_cdc_msg_recv() takes only\nbh_lock_sock().\n\nGive each flag its own byte so a store no longer touches its neighbours.\nAll readers test them as booleans and are unchanged. struct smc_connection\ngrows by two bytes.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80980"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09a9cbadc05f452405de31012bd2c428b601291a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/313f79149eb337411c64e2c247234b62ef9a3cb9"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2cb7a8d64b7e8ccdc69bbe48fe9c4eaa79c33aec"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db51a8658c11a82432b64999519a269c3aabb447"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-10-03T11:04:09Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - smc_cdc_msg_validate() runs from the SMC-R CDC receive tasklet on RDMA completions, and teardown is driven by CLC DECLINE (FIRST_CONTACT) or LLC DELETE_LINK_ALL from the same peer. SMC-Rv2 is RoCEv2 over UDP/4791 (IP-routable) with the CLC handshake on plain TCP, so a remote host that can reach an AF_SMC listener hits the path.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race: it sends CDC failover_validation messages that store out_of_sync from the receive tasklet (no sock lock) while concurrently forcing smc_conn_kill()/smc_conn_free() via CLC decline, CDC close/abort, or LLC link-delete, and can retry across many connections in the same link group.\nPR:N - SMC has no peer authentication. Completing the CLC handshake to a listening AF_SMC/IPPROTO_SMC socket and sending CDC/CLC/LLC messages requires no credentials, capabilities, or local account, matching other SMC remote bugs.\nUI:N - CDC is processed in a softirq tasklet from the RDMA completion queue and CLC decline is handled in the handshake worker; no local user or application action is required beyond the already-listening SMC server.\nS:U - The corrupted flags and resulting UAF stay inside kernel objects (smc_connection, smc_sock, smc_link_group) in the same security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - A lost killed/freed/out_of_sync bit from the shared-byte RMW lets CDC continue after unregister or lets smc_conn_free() run twice (duplicate smc_lgr_put), a use-after-free of the socket and link group that can be reallocated to disclose kernel memory.\nI:H - The same UAF/double-free writes through a reused smc_sock (sk_err, sk_data_ready, queue_work on abort_work/close_work) and link-group refcounts, giving heap-spray primitives for arbitrary kernel write and control-flow hijack.\nA:H - Use-after-free and double-free of the connection and link group oops or panic in softirq/workqueue context (refcount underflow, as in related SMC UAFs), and the attacker can trigger it repeatedly without authentication."
    }
  }
}