{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-80747",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80747"
  ],
  "published": "2026-09-03T08:26:46Z",
  "summary": "drm/amdkfd: Add bounds check for CRAT subtype length",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdkfd: Add bounds check for CRAT subtype length\n\nThe CRAT parser validates that the subtype header fits within the image,\nbut does not verify that the advertised subtype length fits. A malformed\nCRAT table with an oversized length field causes out-of-bounds reads when\nkfd_parse_subtype() casts the header to specific subtype structures.\n\nAdd validation that sub_type_hdr + length does not exceed the image\nboundary before parsing the subtype contents.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 48e1d1e6e8798aef0312e68d8e586021b5b3cf4d)",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80747"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca91e0cc8087568e4b791648a7c01e804f48cb73"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e7566ba4739dd573c331adde1c96690f7a567bd"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-09-04T04:58:50Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.0,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The vulnerable kfd_parse_crat_table() runs only during amdgpu/amdkfd bring-up (kfd_topology_init at module load and kfd_topology_add_device on GPU probe). On affected kernels, ACPI CRAT is copied from firmware via acpi_get_table(\"CRAT\"); there is no network, ioctl, or /dev/kfd path to this parser.\nAC:L - A malicious ACPI CRAT can set subtype length so only the 8-byte generic header fits in the remaining image while kfd_parse_subtype() casts to larger structs (cache, CU, iolink). The out-of-bounds read is deterministic at boot with no races or attacker-uncontrollable memory layout.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires only a crafted ACPI CRAT in platform firmware/UEFI parsed automatically at boot via kfd_create_crat_image_acpi(). No Linux user account, capability, or /dev/kfd access is needed; only control of firmware-supplied CRAT contents before KFD topology initialization.\nUI:N - CRAT parsing occurs automatically during kernel boot and amdgpu/KFD module initialization when topology is built. No user mount, file open, or other discretionary action is required beyond powering on hardware that contains the malicious ACPI table.\nS:U - Impact is confined to kernel heap out-of-bounds reads and corrupted topology metadata within the host kernel security domain. This is not a guest/host VM escape, container sandbox breakout, or IOMMU/DMA boundary bypass.\nC:H - kfd_parse_subtype() casts the generic header to large subtype structures and reads past the CRAT buffer boundary (e.g., cache sibling_map[32], iolink, computeunit fields). Leaked adjacent kernel heap bytes populate topology objects exposed via world-readable /sys/class/kfd/kfd/topology/ attributes (0444).\nI:L - Out-of-bounds read values (sizes, proximity domains, sibling maps, bandwidth fields) are stored into kmalloc'd kernel topology structures (mem_props, cache_props, io_link_props), modifying kernel metadata with attacker-influenced data derived from reads past the allocation.\nA:H - Out-of-bounds reads during early init can dereference unmapped pages and trigger a kernel oops or panic during amdgpu/KFD bring-up. Related malformed-CRAT parser bugs at the same code path also cause infinite-loop denial of service, confirming high availability impact from CRAT parsing flaws."
    }
  }
}