{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-80670",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80670"
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-28T06:50:33Z",
  "summary": "perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()\n\nmachine__resolve() accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checking\nal->cpu >= 0 and env->cpu != NULL, but without validating al->cpu\nagainst env->nr_cpus_avail.  Since al->cpu comes from the untrusted\nperf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an\nout-of-bounds heap read.\n\nUse perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds.\nAlso bounds-check al->cpu before the cast to struct perf_cpu (int16_t):\nwithout this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the\naccessor's internal check and returning CPU 0's topology.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80670"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9e8406651dcc1c19238aad11861a758683525b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb266a14c16a93eb4db7b56a452d6be93f8bdcd4"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5484b43a0ec8231c36fba6ead654cb72dbba8b8f"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-29T06:25:05Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.1,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - machine__resolve() is reached when perf tools parse untrusted perf.data samples via perf report/script/mem/kvm/diff and related builtins; recordings are routinely ingested over the network through stdin pipes (perf -i -) or automated CI/profiling services that analyze uploaded artifacts, giving a remote attacker a network path to supply the malicious CPU index.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls sample.cpu in the crafted perf.data PERF_RECORD_SAMPLE payload; once perf opens the file or pipe, a single sample with cpu >= nr_cpus_avail deterministically triggers the out-of-bounds read without races, timing, or uncontrollable memory layout.\nPR:N - Processing malicious perf.data requires no Linux capabilities or init-namespace root; any remote party who can supply a recording to a profiling pipeline, bug-report workflow, or piped perf session can trigger the bug on the analyzing host without local account privileges on that system.\nUI:N - No interactive victim action beyond normal automated ingestion of perf recordings is required; an attacker can deliver a crafted file to CI bots, shared profiling servers, or piped analysis sessions that invoke perf non-interactively, without the analyst manually opening attachments.\nS:U - The flaw is confined to the userspace perf tool process parsing the recording; impact does not cross VM, IOMMU, or container/kernel security boundaries and remains within the same security authority as the perf analyzer process.\nC:H - The bug is an attacker-controlled out-of-bounds heap read through env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id with no upper bound on the index relative to the allocated topology array, enabling disclosure of adjacent heap contents (metadata, pointers, strings) from the perf process address space.\nI:N - The vulnerability performs only an out-of-bounds read of topology fields into al->socket; it does not write memory, corrupt heap metadata, or provide a direct arbitrary-write or code-execution primitive in the vulnerable code path.\nA:H - An out-of-bounds heap read with a large crafted CPU index commonly causes an immediate SIGSEGV or abort of the perf analysis process, denying availability of profiling, CI performance triage, and incident-response workflows that depend on perf report/script completing successfully."
    }
  }
}