{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-80559", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2026-80559" ], "published": "2026-08-26T14:37:59Z", "summary": "Input: sur40 - fix input device registration ordering", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: sur40 - fix input device registration ordering\n\nIn sur40_probe(), input_register_device() was previously called early before\nthe V4L2 video device and vb2_queue components were fully initialized. If\nuserspace opened the input device immediately upon registration, sur40_open()\nwould trigger and start the sur40_poll() worker thread. This worker thread\ninvokes sur40_process_video() and accesses the uninitialized vb2_queue\nstructure, leading to a data race and potential system crash.\n\nFurthermore, if V4L2 or video registration failed after input_register_device()\nsucceeded, the error path fell through to calling input_free_device() on a\nsuccessfully registered device instead of input_unregister_device(), corrupting\ninput core state.\n\nMove input_register_device() to the very end of sur40_probe(). This ensures\nthe V4L2 and video queue structures are fully initialized before polling can\nstart, and naturally resolves the error path bug since input_free_device()\nis now only called when input registration has not yet occurred.\n\nTo maintain strict LIFO (Last-In, First-Out) teardown ordering, also move\ninput_unregister_device() to the very beginning of sur40_disconnect(). This\nguarantees that the input polling worker thread is stopped before V4L2\nvideo components or control handlers are unregistered.", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": { "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e", "upstream_version": "6.1.47", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.1.184", "compiled_filter": false } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-80559" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd4ecce2fd87760c0ad9a9d28c9fc62ea1dbfd3d" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dab741c9da72102a37cc1020a929051b7c45f9fb" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/764b507be7b51787e1f577ca3bf0bab7efe81ff8" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e8ed76a4f3572e637653f0654cccdf617903231" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83aa12f9f2468a4fbef027c09224dc1011850fb0" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c1c5227c93f18cd329dd754b4df5e0e2daece1e" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/beb9b0bd6e6e23f5e9e42b7ef890a50f57f1f3aa" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9da976eb649c9e2f588a4499410e4d8af687925f" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-27T05:18:36Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 7.8, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:L - Exploitation is via open() on /dev/input/eventX (evdev -> input_open_device -> sur40_open -> sur40_poll -> sur40_process_video) racing sur40_probe() before vb2_queue_init(); on permanently installed PixelSense/SUR40 kiosk tables no physical USB access is needed at attack time.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race by monitoring udev/inotify for the new input node and immediately opening it during USB hotplug or reboot probe; polling starts synchronously in input_dev_poller_start, making the uninitialized vb2_queue access reliably triggerable without uncontrollable kernel preconditions.\nPR:L - Triggering sur40_open requires only local userspace access to the evdev node (typically membership in the input group or equivalent kiosk-app privileges opening /dev/input/event*), not real root in the init namespace; user namespaces cannot substitute for this device access.\nUI:N - No victim interaction is required beyond the attacker's own actions; they can open the input device themselves (or rely on an auto-opening compositor during reconnect) and time the race during probe without needing another user to touch the screen or perform any action.\nS:U - Impact is confined to kernel memory corruption and crashes within the host input/USB driver context on the same system; it does not cross VM, container, or IOMMU security boundaries despite potential local privilege escalation as a follow-on.\nC:H - Concurrent access to a partially initialized vb2_queue is a kernel data race that can read uninitialized queue state, and the probe error path calls input_free_device() on a registered device, corrupting input-core linked lists\u2014both are memory-corruption primitives leverageable for kernel information disclosure.\nI:H - The input_free_device() misuse corrupts global input-core list state (definite kernel structure corruption), and racing poll against vb2_queue_init can invoke vb2_buffer_done and list operations on uninitialized queue internals, enabling exploitable heap/control-structure writes.\nA:H - The fix commit explicitly cites a data race on the uninitialized vb2_queue leading to system crash; corrupting input-core registration state or racing teardown during USB disconnect can cause kernel oops/panic and deny service on interactive SUR40/PixelSense deployments." } } }