{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-74561", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2026-74561" ], "published": "2026-08-15T12:28:42Z", "summary": "nexthop: avoid unlocked f6i_list walk in nh_rt_cache_flush", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnexthop: avoid unlocked f6i_list walk in nh_rt_cache_flush\n\nnh_rt_cache_flush() walks nh->f6i_list during an RTNL-serialized nexthop\nreplace without holding nh->lock, racing the unlocked IPv6 route\nadd/delete that mutate the list under nh->lock and free fib6_info\nentries (nh_rt_cache_flush() is inlined into rtm_new_nexthop()):\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nh_rt_cache_flush (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2243)\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff888012953e18 by task exploit/146\n nh_rt_cache_flush (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2243)\n replace_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:2610)\n rtm_new_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3323)\n rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7076)\n\nUnlike the other f6i_list walks, this one bumps each route's sernum via\nfib6_update_sernum_upto_root(), which needs tb6_lock; taking nh->lock\naround it would invert the established tb6_lock -> nh->lock order and\ndeadlock. As the only purpose is to invalidate cached dsts, bump the\nIPv6 sernum for the whole netns with rt_genid_bump_ipv6() instead,\nmirroring the rt_cache_flush() already done for IPv4 just above.", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:13", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1", "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1", "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1", "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1", "1:6.18.50-1+rpt1" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-v8-rt", "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-v8-rt", "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v8-rt", "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-v8-rt", "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.50+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.18.50-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.18.50-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.18.50-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.18.50-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.50+rpt-rpi-v8-rt", "binary_version": "1:6.18.50-1+rpt1" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "66318c5b5cd8145a662303af12ed39ac07eb27cc", "upstream_version": "6.18.29", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": null }, "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "95b85bebbedcaedfa7ca79116ed38b7376fba412", "upstream_version": "6.18.33", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": null }, "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "c8c7494100e99ee05b11aaa4f0588a223a63d1af", "upstream_version": "6.18.34", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": null }, "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "60ea684a8ace97bb0db1a16e20753bdd6ab371ff", "upstream_version": "6.18.39", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": null }, "1:6.18.50-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "cff533aec2fa601846766b32ff57204e0a61bed7", "upstream_version": "6.18.50", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": null } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-74561" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44f53e4331a30fabc38a411fae7524341b618db3" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4787a6d2629b4e8c0b6bacab1f75c1660eca44d9" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-17T05:50:24Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 8.8, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:L - The slab use-after-free is reached only via local RTNETLINK on AF_NETLINK sockets: RTM_NEWNEXTHOP with NLM_F_REPLACE drives replace_nexthop()->nh_rt_cache_flush(), racing concurrent RTM_NEWROUTE/RTM_DELROUTE IPv6 route changes; it is not triggered by remote packet processing.\nAC:L - The race is attacker-controlled: one thread replaces a nexthop under rtnl_net_lock while another concurrently adds/deletes IPv6 routes via unlocked inet6_rtm_newroute/inet6_rtm_delroute handlers; Microsoft reproduced reliable KASAN slab-use-after-free with this pattern.\nPR:L - rtnetlink_rcv_msg() requires CAP_NET_ADMIN via netlink_net_capable() for all non-GET handlers; unprivileged local users obtain this inside a user/network namespace (unshare -Urn), not only init-namespace root.\nUI:N - No victim interaction is required; exploitation is fully attacker-driven through coordinated local netlink nexthop replace and IPv6 route add/delete commands from attacker-controlled processes.\nS:C - A successful UAF from CAP_NET_ADMIN inside an unprivileged user/network namespace corrupts host kernel slab memory and can escape the namespace/container sandbox to compromise the host system, crossing the container-to-host security boundary.\nC:H - The unlocked nh->f6i_list walk dereferences freed fib6_info objects (KASAN read of size 8 at nh_rt_cache_flush), enabling arbitrary kernel memory disclosure via slab heap reuse of attacker-groomed objects.\nI:H - Beyond the UAF read, fib6_update_sernum_upto_root() writes fn_sernum through stale fib6_info/fib6_table pointers; slab UAF on fib6_info provides memory corruption primitives for arbitrary kernel writes and local privilege escalation.\nA:H - The confirmed KASAN slab-use-after-free in nh_rt_cache_flush during nexthop replace causes kernel oops/panic; UAF list walks are inherently crash-prone and can be triggered repeatedly for denial of service." } } }