{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-74417",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-74417"
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:04:33Z",
  "summary": "drm/radeon: fix integer overflow in radeon_align_pitch()",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/radeon: fix integer overflow in radeon_align_pitch()\n\nradeon_align_pitch() has the same kind of overflow issue as the old\namdgpu helper: both the alignment round-up add and the final\n'aligned * cpp' calculation can overflow signed int.\n\nIf that wraps, radeon_mode_dumb_create() can end up returning an\ninvalid pitch or creating a zero-sized dumb buffer.\n\nFix this by using check_add_overflow() for the alignment round-up and\ncheck_mul_overflow() for the final pitch calculation, returning 0 on\noverflow. Also reject zero pitch and size in\nradeon_mode_dumb_create().\n\nFound via AST-based call-graph analysis using sqry.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-74417"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7b44937c548c2c987fcdd129f8896741004bed6"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/415bb9893e249e46aa5159f7363a11512cf06fa9"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9dfa176899d488e48bb7342d2c43ddd36e66318"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc7b5b5599472277e71e5bd2712740651c7c5be"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce3b24eb3ee8f82de851535f516bf21f83e82259"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-17T05:50:24Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The bug is reached only via DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CREATE_DUMB on a local primary DRM device node (/dev/dri/card*); radeon_drm_ioctl() dispatches to radeon_mode_dumb_create() -> radeon_align_pitch(), with no network, Bluetooth, or remote packet path to this legacy radeon KMS driver.\nAC:L - An attacker fully controls width, height, and bpp in the ioctl and can pick values (e.g. width=0x3FFFFFC0, bpp=32) that pass generic drm_mode_create_dumb() checks yet wrap signed-int pitch math, deterministically yielding zero or invalid pitch without races or uncontrollable layout.\nPR:L - Exploitation requires opening the primary DRM node (render clients are blocked because CREATE_DUMB lacks DRM_RENDER_ALLOW); typical access is via the video group or logind session ACLs, i.e. a low-privileged local account, not root/CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init namespace.\nUI:N - The attacker triggers the overflow from their own process by issuing CREATE_DUMB with crafted dimensions; no victim must mount filesystems, click links, or perform any separate action.\nS:U - Impact is in-kernel GEM/TTM memory corruption and privilege escalation within the host kernel security boundary, not a KVM guest-to-host escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-authority scope change.\nC:H - Signed-int overflow can return pitch 0 or a bogus u32 pitch while drm_mode_create_dumb() already validated a much larger stride, creating undersized VRAM/GTT GEM objects whose metadata mismatches actual backing, enabling out-of-bounds kernel reads of adjacent allocations.\nI:H - A zero-sized or undersized dumb buffer paired with attacker-chosen width/height lets subsequent mmap, map_dumb, and GPU scanout paths treat the object as larger than allocated, corrupting adjacent kernel heap/VRAM objects and enabling control-flow hijack primitives.\nA:H - Pre-fix code allocates zero-byte GEM objects on overflow instead of failing cleanly, and malformed pitch/size metadata can provoke kernel oopses, GPU faults, or repeatable denial of service when the BO is mapped or used for display."
    }
  }
}