{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-72278",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-72278"
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:04:33Z",
  "summary": "KVM: arm64: nv: Re-translate VNCR before injecting abort",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: nv: Re-translate VNCR before injecting abort\n\nKVM faults in the VNCR page with FOLL_WRITE whenever the guest aborts\nfor a write, similar to how a regular stage-2 mapping is handled. It is\nentirely possible that the guest reads from the VNCR before writing to\nit, in which case the PFN could only be read-only.\n\nInvalidate the VNCR TLB and re-fetch the translation upon taking a VNCR\nabort, allowing the host mapping to be faulted in for write the second\ntime around. Interestingly enough, this also satisfies the ordering\nrequirements of FEAT_ETS2/3 between descriptor updates and MMU faults.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1",
        "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1",
        "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1",
        "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.29+rpt-rpi-v8-rt",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.33+rpt-rpi-v8-rt",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v8-rt",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.18.39+rpt-rpi-v8-rt",
            "binary_version": "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.18.29-1+rpt1": {
            "linux_commit": "66318c5b5cd8145a662303af12ed39ac07eb27cc",
            "upstream_version": "6.18.29",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.18.40"
          },
          "1:6.18.33-1+rpt1": {
            "linux_commit": "95b85bebbedcaedfa7ca79116ed38b7376fba412",
            "upstream_version": "6.18.33",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.18.40"
          },
          "1:6.18.34-1+rpt1": {
            "linux_commit": "c8c7494100e99ee05b11aaa4f0588a223a63d1af",
            "upstream_version": "6.18.34",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.18.40"
          },
          "1:6.18.39-1+rpt1": {
            "linux_commit": "60ea684a8ace97bb0db1a16e20753bdd6ab371ff",
            "upstream_version": "6.18.39",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.18.40"
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72278"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea7a76d7d614b5f82b4d0785f9af3550e860a71a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a5dd8cf4d58ea28da132c2097cd1c525302ac48"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb645aa0a4caeaf7f9cd32e9a948594d434c1a8f"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-17T05:50:24Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.3,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The flaw is reached only when an arm64 nested-KVM L1 hypervisor triggers VNCR_EL2 data aborts (ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR with ESR_ELx_VNCR) handled via KVM_RUN through kvm_handle_vncr_abort(); no network, adjacent-radio, or physical-device path reaches this code.\nAC:L - An attacker controlling an L1 nested-hypervisor VM can reliably issue read-then-write VNCR accesses, remap the VNCR page, and force translation/permission faults; nested virt on arm64 cloud hosts is an attacker-selectable deployment, not an uncontrollable condition.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires no host root or init-namespace capabilities beyond running hypervisor code in a tenant KVM guest on an arm64 host with nested virtualization enabled; the attacker operates entirely from within their assigned VM, consistent with other arm64 KVM nested-virt CVE scoring.\nUI:N - No victim user or administrator action is required beyond the attacker operating their own nested-virtualization workload; VNCR faults, pseudo-TLB reuse, and repeated write triggers are fully attacker-driven from within the guest.\nS:C - Stale VNCR pseudo-TLB and fixmap state lets guest-controlled faults cause host KVM to map and access the wrong guest physical pages when emulating EL2 register state, crossing the guest-to-hypervisor security boundary beyond the guest's intended authority.\nC:H - Reusing a cached VNCR translation without re-walking guest page tables can make the host read unintended guest physical pages through the per-CPU fixmap during VNCR emulation, providing a stale-translation information-disclosure primitive across guest memory views.\nI:H - Without re-translation on write aborts, a writable host fixmap established under a stale read-only fault can let the hypervisor write nested EL2 register values into the wrong guest physical page, corrupting memory the VMM expected to isolate.\nA:H - Incorrect permission/external-abort injection on VNCR write faults after a prior read leaves nested hypervisors unable to progress and can drive tight host-side fault-handling loops, causing CPU exhaustion and denial of service to co-resident workloads."
    }
  }
}
