{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-72045",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-72045"
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:04:33Z",
  "summary": "octeontx2-af: cn10k: restrict VF LMTLINE sharing to its own PF",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocteontx2-af: cn10k: restrict VF LMTLINE sharing to its own PF\n\nrvu_mbox_handler_lmtst_tbl_setup() uses req->base_pcifunc as a direct\nindex into the LMT map table to read another function's LMTLINE\nphysical base address and copy it into the caller's own LMT map table\nentry. The mailbox dispatcher authenticates req->hdr.pcifunc from the\nIRQ source, but req->base_pcifunc is a separate payload field and is\nnot sanitized.\n\nReject the request with -EPERM when a VF caller's base_pcifunc is not a\nvalid function under its own PF. is_pf_func_valid() bounds the FUNC field\nto the PF's configured VF count, keeping the computed index inside the\ncaller's own slot block.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.184",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72045"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04c014e49b9f53d58a8f94adece8a0af3ae1b85c"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6967dd944be2a71eddab3a2ae1a1a4dd9e5f8eed"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9c5b03208507dd6d58b0c23a2c60b5c2f4c1b11"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54535692bec9ef464adc714108eb19e49e38b5a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c73b8795b45f4ad5a95120d2e9b435ea4616e08e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59da37fee81a8d76079313348ca13c5bc90dd6ae"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8cdcf3d2caacdee7ddd363705fb4d93b0c1a0915"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-23T12:46:35Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - Exploitation requires local control of an assigned Marvell CN10K/OCTEONTX2 SR-IOV VF and sending a crafted LMTST_TBL_SETUP mailbox message over the PCI VF\u2192AF control path (rvu_afvf_mbox_handler\u2192rvu_mbox_handler_lmtst_tbl_setup); it is not reachable via remote packet delivery.\nAC:L - Once a VF is assigned, the attacker fully controls the unsanitized base_pcifunc payload field and can trigger the flaw deterministically with a single mailbox message; no race, special memory layout, or victim timing is required.\nPR:L - Only control of an assigned VF is needed (typical cloud/tenant VM or container with SR-IOV passthrough, or guest root/CAP_NET_ADMIN managing the VF); host init-namespace root is not required and unprivileged host users cannot reach this hardware mailbox without the VF device.\nUI:N - No victim user action is required; the attacker directly sends the malicious LMTST_TBL_SETUP mailbox request from their VF to the AF handler.\nS:C - A malicious VF tenant can retarget hardware LMTLINE stores to another PF/VF's memory region, crossing the SR-IOV tenant isolation boundary and enabling guest-to-host or guest-to-guest impact on shared CN10K NIC deployments.\nC:H - Redirecting a VF's LMT map entry to another function's LMTLINE region lets the attacker read victim in-flight packet/crypto submission metadata and buffer pointers from shared hardware LMT memory, constituting cross-tenant information disclosure beyond the attacker's scope.\nI:H - After the map-table redirect, the attacker's LMTST flush operations (packet TX SQE submission, NPA aura free, CPT enqueue) are hardware-written into the victim's LMTLINE physical pages, enabling arbitrary cross-tenant memory corruption and potential control of victim I/O submission state.\nA:H - Corrupting another PF/VF's LMTLINE submission buffers can crash or hang the victim's networking/crypto stack (guest kernel oops/panic or persistent TX failure) and the attack can be repeated on demand by resending mailbox requests."
    }
  }
}