{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-68446",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-68446"
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-12T00:06:30Z",
  "summary": "drm/vmwgfx: Validate vmw_surface_metadata::array_size",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/vmwgfx: Validate vmw_surface_metadata::array_size\n\nThis field comes from userspace and should be validated against specific\nlimits depending on which Shader Model (SM) is available.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.183",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68446"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e949adf2d42678fb391a41db277e2fcb12090566"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0403cec2aff8037bc246cf9a0831eb169ddcd9df"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aded8463466ede7a7fbd1bbf821756c67c83e89b"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ff94e1279176b539d451e3e754fdcbd1a8d520a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71779fe8bf403a9b3e28dc59229fa556db32d35d"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1379f0c42b88cb60b9f3757eb5d1e73ad460ed8"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6910ccaf41678f7761ba2e57d72b77d056320b4d"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4f55260f7f7d4dc4d0ee55063dfb0c457b77991"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-19T16:47:12Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The bug is reached through the DRM_IOCTL_VMW_GB_SURFACE_CREATE/_EXT ioctls on the vmwgfx render node (/dev/dri/renderD128), i.e. local access to the device file on a VMware guest; no network or physical access is involved.\nAC:L - The attacker directly supplies array_size, mip_levels and base_size in a single ioctl and can deterministically choose values that wrap the 32-bit size/subresource computations; no race or uncontrolled precondition is required.\nPR:L - Both ioctls are registered DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so an unprivileged local user (or containerized workload) holding the normal render-node permissions can call them without DRM master, root, or any capability.\nUI:N - Exploitation is entirely attacker-driven via ioctl calls on an already-open render node; no action by another user or administrator is needed.\nS:U - The unvalidated value corrupts guest kernel memory and device-command state within the same kernel security authority; no VM/IOMMU or sandbox boundary is crossed by the flaw itself.\nC:H - The wrapped res->guest_memory_size makes the backing buffer far smaller than the surface the host device is told to service, and the undersized dirty->boxes array is indexed out of bounds, giving out-of-bounds reads of adjacent kernel heap data that can be leaked back through surface contents.\nI:H - The u32 overflows in vmw_surface_get_serialized_size() and num_layers*num_mip yield an undersized backing BO and dirty-tracking array, producing controlled out-of-bounds heap writes (SVGA3dBox data and device DMA past the buffer) usable for heap corruption and privilege escalation.\nA:H - Out-of-bounds writes past kvzalloc'd dirty trackers and BO-sized mismatches reliably corrupt kernel heap metadata, causing oopses/panics; huge array_size values also drive enormous allocations, so a local user can crash the guest kernel."
    }
  }
}