{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-68294",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-68294"
  ],
  "published": "2026-08-10T12:08:00Z",
  "summary": "net: qrtr: restrict socket creation to the initial network namespace",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: qrtr: restrict socket creation to the initial network namespace\n\nQRTR keeps its entire port and node state in module-global variables\nthat are not partitioned per network namespace: qrtr_local_nid is a\nsingle global node id (always 1) and qrtr_ports is a single global\nxarray. qrtr_port_lookup() and qrtr_local_enqueue() operate on that\nglobal state with no network-namespace check, and qrtr_create() places\nno restriction on the namespace a socket is created in.\n\nAs a result an unprivileged process that creates an AF_QIPCRTR socket\nin a separate network namespace, e.g. via\nunshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET), can send QRTR datagrams -\nincluding control-plane messages such as QRTR_TYPE_NEW_SERVER - to QRTR\nsockets owned by another namespace, and vice versa. The receiving\nsocket sees such a message as coming from node id 1, indistinguishable\nfrom a legitimate local client, breaking the isolation that network\nnamespaces are expected to provide.\n\nQRTR is a transport to global hardware endpoints (the modem and other\nremote processors) and has no per-namespace semantics; its in-kernel\nname service already creates its socket in init_net only. Confine the\nsocket family to the initial network namespace, as other\nnon-namespace-aware socket families do (see llc_ui_create() and the\nieee802154 socket code).",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.183",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68294"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7814f6a3415cad38aa8d6dfc573df778260d66aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d22b94a154ccb9755dddfff802fe3e2b1adbab5"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d351fe0654a20c9f95a61b05d24ebe6d4be3fbb"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b95e1f0d6e6342c427cb341ee18a894b146b789"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f488116df769bdaf89c93371350e49e12133e70f"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8150c48fb978e01689f94ed80148f8a7499ae571"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/659b9b4f194bb56b9903cc95e786ef1d438baa7d"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b536db8fb32da9e9c62f2bb45e2e319331f0426"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-19T16:47:12Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - Exploitation requires local access to issue socket()/sendmsg() syscalls on an AF_QIPCRTR socket from within a network namespace on the target system; there is no remote packet path into qrtr_create().\nAC:L - The attack is fully deterministic: unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET), create an AF_QIPCRTR socket (module autoloads via net-pf-42), and sendmsg() to node 1. No race, no memory-layout dependency, no victim state required.\nPR:L - Any unprivileged local user can create the required network namespace via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET), and a containerized process is already in one; the CAP_NET_ADMIN check at qrtr_port_assign() only gates low/control ports and is not needed for this attack.\nUI:N - The attacker performs all steps itself; no action by any other user or administrator is required to trigger the cross-namespace delivery.\nS:C - The flaw defeats the network-namespace confinement boundary itself: a process sandboxed in its own netns reaches the init_net global QRTR control plane, the in-kernel name service, and host-owned sockets, impacting resources under a different security authority than the attacker's container.\nC:H - By spoofing QRTR_TYPE_NEW_SERVER to the name service, a confined attacker registers itself as a well-known service so legitimate host clients direct their QMI traffic to it, and it can address modem/remote-processor endpoints directly, exposing sensitive telephony data it was isolated from.\nI:H - The attacker can inject arbitrary control-plane messages (NEW_SERVER, DEL_SERVER, BYE, DEL_CLIENT) that the receiver cannot distinguish from a legitimate node-1 client, corrupting the global service registry and allowing forged replies to host clients and commands to the modem.\nA:H - A single spoofed QRTR_TYPE_BYE makes ctrl_cmd_bye() delete every server registered on the local node and broadcast their removal, and the QRTR_NS_MAX_SERVERS/MAX_LOOKUPS limits can be exhausted, causing complete and repeatable loss of QRTR/modem IPC service for the whole system."
    }
  }
}