{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-45988",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-45988"
  ],
  "published": "2026-05-27T12:59:23Z",
  "summary": "rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets\n\nIf a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end\nup in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry.\n\nFix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE\npacket and thereby elicit a further response.  Similarly, discard an\nincoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE;\nthe server will send another CHALLENGE.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45988"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d61482be4aae1835b78875761206241835a7510e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b89868305052b94a91b708c462bc2281fa42a4a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76cb9a2d252274adfae6e293a292434631a7d472"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f55b383070170e988e4dec28be2af1714d258521"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0422e7a4883f25101903f3e8105c0808aa5f4ce9"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T13:16:28Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - rxrpc is a UDP/IP network protocol; the vulnerable CHALLENGE/RESPONSE handling processes packets received from a remote peer (a connecting client, or a malicious/spoofed AFS server) over the network.\nAC:L - The bug is gated on a transient `-ENOMEM`/`-EAGAIN` during handshake processing, but an attacker can induce the required memory pressure by flooding the target with concurrent rxrpc handshakes, making the failing `GFP_NOFS` allocation reachable repeatably.\nPR:N - The CHALLENGE/RESPONSE packets are processed during the security handshake before the connection is secured (`RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING`), so no authentication or credentials are needed to reach the code.\nUI:N - A server processing an incoming RESPONSE, and automated AFS clients/daemons processing a CHALLENGE, require no human interaction to trigger the fault.\nS:U - The corruption and its impact are confined to the kernel's own memory/security authority; no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is involved.\nC:H - The CHALLENGE-path refcount underflow frees the `rxrpc_connection` while still referenced; a UAF lets an attacker reallocate and read controlled freed-object contents, enabling kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - The same use-after-free / refcount-underflow on the connection object enables heap grooming and write primitives over the freed structure, allowing kernel memory/control-flow corruption.\nA:H - The double-put UAF and the re-decryption of partially-decrypted RESPONSE packets reliably oops/panic the kernel and abort connections, causing a denial of service."
    }
  }
}