{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-45956",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-45956"
  ],
  "published": "2026-05-27T12:19:29Z",
  "summary": "drm/exynos: vidi: use priv->vidi_dev for ctx lookup in vidi_connection_ioctl()",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/exynos: vidi: use priv->vidi_dev for ctx lookup in vidi_connection_ioctl()\n\nvidi_connection_ioctl() retrieves the driver_data from drm_dev->dev to\nobtain a struct vidi_context pointer. However, drm_dev->dev is the\nexynos-drm master device, and the driver_data contained therein is not\nthe vidi component device, but a completely different device.\n\nThis can lead to various bugs, ranging from null pointer dereferences and\ngarbage value accesses to, in unlucky cases, out-of-bounds errors,\nuse-after-free errors, and more.\n\nTo resolve this issue, we need to store/delete the vidi device pointer in\nexynos_drm_private->vidi_dev during bind/unbind, and then read this\nexynos_drm_private->vidi_dev within ioctl() to obtain the correct\nstruct vidi_context pointer.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.167",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45956"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2987642c5213508c6c9e718324c0d5289a92c474"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65d1213baffa363f2eb1117b1dc7acc573b890f8"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/875fa28690e93ed5296c31d3344556c6bb867234"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21ca24ba51a2c28bcc4df9d7e5a40b0eb66ab76d"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5fc86d753dd4c281a943b92f0eef02d31af03d7"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a540f767642f75240a6c35f6a65b69e44cfcea9d"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3968a0d85b211e197f2f4f06268a7031079e0d0"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T13:16:28Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The flaw is reached only through the Exynos DRM primary device node via DRM_IOCTL_EXYNOS_VIDI_CONNECTION (local ioctl path through drm_ioctl), not over the network.\nAC:L - Once the VIDI driver is enabled and the caller passes DRM_AUTH checks, every call uses the wrong context pointer deterministically; the attacker fully controls ioctl arguments and timing without external race luck.\nPR:L - Exploitation requires a local process that can open the primary DRM device and satisfy DRM_AUTH (authenticated DRM client or CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which includes user-namespace admin); it does not require init-namespace root, but unauthenticated users cannot reach the ioctl.\nUI:N - No victim interaction is required beyond the attacker (or their already-authenticated DRM client) issuing the malicious ioctl.\nS:U - Impact is kernel memory corruption and instability within the same kernel security domain; it is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-authority sandbox break.\nC:H - Type-confused reads/writes against a drm_device masquerading as vidi_context can dereference attacker-influenced garbage pointers and, on affected versions in the CVE window, companion paths also allowed unsafe EDID handling; per project guidance, UAF/wrong-free and uncontrolled reads warrant High confidentiality impact.\nI:H - The ioctl writes connection state and EDID pointers into misaligned drm_device fields and may call drm_edid_free() on attacker-influenced addresses, enabling arbitrary kernel memory corruption and potential control-flow hijack, not merely a benign crash.\nA:H - The fix and commit message document NULL dereferences, out-of-bounds access, and use-after-free outcomes that can oops or panic the kernel; any such crash maps to High availability impact."
    }
  }
}