{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-43495",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-43495"
  ],
  "published": "2026-05-21T12:13:01Z",
  "summary": "net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler\n\nt7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as\na loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer\ncontains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte\nbuffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.\n\nAdd a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header\nfields to guard against undersized messages.\n\nAdd a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.\n\nIn t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a\nremaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len\nagainst the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed\ninteger overflow on offset.\n\nPass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after\nskb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.176",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-43495"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/307c5d0f36a5c74042217136da5bfbd9f7504650"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f94450ce5053b36002995b72d1fa1db3bb08c5bf"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9855e063e063158cc5bded576382599dc3133202"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b56d7903ab804481f5233a259d5f341e9fd513c"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd4f4c93c1488d7100b9964f2da4c8b3c29652f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T13:16:28Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:A - The vulnerable parser consumes control messages supplied by the cellular modem/baseband over PCIe; the realistic worst-case attacker is a rogue base station / over-the-air baseband compromise that pivots to the host kernel, which is the cellular-radio analog of WiFi/Bluetooth adjacency. It is not directly Network-reachable because these are internal AP\u2194modem control messages, not internet-routable packets.\nAC:L - A malicious/compromised modem reliably triggers the OOB read by setting port_count to a large value (up to 65535) in an undersized buffer; there is no race or attacker-uncontrollable precondition, and the ~256 KB read reliably reaches unmapped memory.\nPR:N - The modem's messages are parsed automatically during the handshake/port-enumeration with no authentication or privilege check on the device-supplied data, so the attacker needs no host-side credentials.\nUI:N - Port enumeration and runtime-feature handshake are processed automatically by kernel threads at modem init and runtime; no user action is required.\nS:U - The vulnerable code and the impacted resource are both the host kernel; there is no crossing into a different security authority such as a VM/hypervisor or IOMMU domain.\nC:H - The flaw is a large slab-out-of-bounds read of up to ~256 KB of adjacent kernel heap, and the read values steer channel enable/disable behavior, providing a disclosure oracle \u2014 well above a few bounded bytes.\nI:H - The out-of-bounds data is interpreted as port_info and drives kernel driver channel enable/disable state, modifying kernel-internal state based on attacker-influenced out-of-bounds memory; rounding up under uncertainty.\nA:H - An out-of-bounds read of up to ~256 KB past a 12-byte slab object reliably crosses into unmapped/poisoned pages, causing a kernel oops/panic (denial of service)."
    }
  }
}