{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-43249",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-43249"
  ],
  "published": "2026-05-06T11:29:17Z",
  "summary": "9p/xen: protect xen_9pfs_front_free against concurrent calls",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\n9p/xen: protect xen_9pfs_front_free against concurrent calls\n\nThe xenwatch thread can race with other back-end change notifications\nand call xen_9pfs_front_free() twice, hitting the observed general\nprotection fault due to a double-free. Guard the teardown path so only\none caller can release the front-end state at a time, preventing the\ncrash.\n\nThis is a fix for the following double-free:\n\n[   27.052347] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI\n[   27.052357] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 32 Comm: xenwatch Not tainted 6.18.0-02087-g51ab33fc0a8b-dirty #60 PREEMPT(none)\n[   27.052363] RIP: e030:xen_9pfs_front_free+0x1d/0x150\n[   27.052368] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 48 c7 c7 48 d0 92 85 53 e8 cb cb 05 00 48 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 <48> 3b 28 0f 85 f9 28 35 fe 48 3b 6a 08 0f 85 ef 28 35 fe 48 89 42\n[   27.052377] RSP: e02b:ffffc9004016fdd0 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[   27.052381] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff88800d66e400 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[   27.052385] RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[   27.052389] RBP: ffff88800a887040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[   27.052393] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888009e46b68\n[   27.052397] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800a887040\n[   27.052404] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88808ca57000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[   27.052408] CS:  e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[   27.052412] CR2: 00007f9714004360 CR3: 0000000004834000 CR4: 0000000000050660\n[   27.052418] Call Trace:\n[   27.052420]  <TASK>\n[   27.052422]  xen_9pfs_front_changed+0x5d5/0x720\n[   27.052426]  ? xenbus_otherend_changed+0x72/0x140\n[   27.052430]  ? __pfx_xenwatch_thread+0x10/0x10\n[   27.052434]  xenwatch_thread+0x94/0x1c0\n[   27.052438]  ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10\n[   27.052442]  kthread+0xf8/0x240\n[   27.052445]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[   27.052449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[   27.052452]  ret_from_fork+0x16b/0x1a0\n[   27.052456]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[   27.052459]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[   27.052463]  </TASK>\n[   27.052465] Modules linked in:\n[   27.052471] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-43249"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5d00dff97118a32fcf5fec7a4c3f864c4620c4e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59e7707492576bdbfa8c1dbe7d90791df31e4773"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf841d43f7a33d75675ba7f4e214ac1c67913065"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce8ded2e61f47747e31eeefb44dc24a2160a7e32"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T13:16:28Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:A - The vulnerable 9p Xen frontend is reached through Xenbus/backend state changes from a paired Xen backend or service domain on the same host/logical I/O fabric. It is not directly routable over IP, but it is reachable across an adjacent inter-domain channel.\nAC:L - A malicious backend can repeatedly queue the state transitions/removal paths that lead to concurrent or repeated xen_9pfs_front_free() calls. The trigger does not depend on conditions outside the attacker-controlled backend notification sequence.\nPR:N - No privileges in the vulnerable guest are required; the guest frontend accepts the triggering state changes from its configured backend via Xenstore. Control of the backend is the attack position rather than a credential inside the target Linux kernel.\nUI:N - No victim user action is needed after the Xen 9pfs frontend device is present and bound. Backend state changes are processed asynchronously by xenwatch.\nS:U - The corrupted objects and resulting crash/code-execution risk are within the same guest Linux kernel running the vulnerable frontend. The issue does not demonstrate a guest-to-host or hypervisor escape.\nC:H - This is kernel heap memory corruption via double-free of frontend state and associated ring resources. Such corruption can plausibly be shaped into use-after-free/freelist manipulation and arbitrary kernel memory disclosure, so the higher impact is warranted.\nI:H - The double-free can corrupt kernel allocator metadata or free a reallocated object, giving a plausible path to arbitrary write or control-flow compromise. Under the required uncertainty rule, this is scored as high integrity impact.\nA:H - The reported failure is a general protection fault in xenwatch from dereferencing poisoned freed memory. A malicious backend can crash the guest kernel, causing high availability impact."
    }
  }
}
