{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2026-23450",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-23450"
  ],
  "published": "2026-04-03T15:24:34Z",
  "summary": "net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()\n\nSyzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].\n\nsmc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path\n(softirq) via icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP\nlistening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock\npointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed\nconcurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock->sk_user_data\nto NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself\ncan be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().\n\nThis leads to two issues:\n\n1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when\n   accessed.\n2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the\n   smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs,\n   ori_af_ops) are accessed.\n\nThe race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1]\ntriggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() ->\nsmc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path\nhas the same race):\n\n  CPU A (softirq)              CPU B (process ctx)\n\n  tcp_v4_rcv()\n    TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:\n    sk = req->rsk_listener\n    sock_hold(sk)\n    /* No lock on listener */\n                               smc_close_active():\n                                 write_lock_bh(cb_lock)\n                                 sk_user_data = NULL\n                                 write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)\n                                 ...\n                                 smc_clcsock_release()\n                                 sock_put(smc->sk) x2\n                                   -> smc_sock freed!\n    tcp_check_req()\n      smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():\n        smc = user_data(sk)\n          -> NULL or dangling\n        smc->queued_smc_hs\n          -> crash!\n\nNote that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects\nwith separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the\nclcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the\nsmc_sock from being freed.\n\nFix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely\naccess smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in\nthe TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on\nsk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN\nflood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.\n\n- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that\n  smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace\n  period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when\n  accessed inside rcu_read_lock().\n- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.\n- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&smc->sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the\n  smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close\n  path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.\n\nNote: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of\nsk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for\nNULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing\nany smc_sock field, so it is not affected.\n\nReproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run,\nthe issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.\n\n[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.167",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-23450"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f315277856caeafcd996c2611afc085ca2d53275"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e4f873879e075bbd4eb1c644d6933303ac5eba4"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f00fc26c8a06442b225a350fe000c0a11483e6a3"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cadf3da46c15523fba90d80c9955f536ee3b4023"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd7579f0a2c84ba8a7d4f206201b50dc8ddf90c2"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fab5ece76fb42a761178dcd0ebcbf578377b0dd"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d5e4538364b9ceb1ac2941a4deb86650afb3538"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T13:16:28Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - The vulnerable callback is invoked from the TCP receive path via tcp_check_req() or tcp_get_cookie_sock() for packets hitting an SMC listening socket. A remote peer can reach this pre-authentication code by completing or racing TCP handshakes to the exposed listener.\nAC:L - The trigger is a close-vs-handshake race, but the attacker can drive the packet side repeatedly with concurrent connection attempts and SYN-cookie/normal ACK paths. There is no rare memory layout, special authentication state, or non-default runtime condition required beyond an enabled SMC listener.\nPR:N - No kernel capability, local account, or SMC protocol authentication is checked before smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() dereferences sk_user_data. The network peer reaches the vulnerable path before accept-time SMC CLC processing.\nUI:N - Exploitation does not require a victim user action once an SMC listener is present. Incoming network traffic and concurrent listener teardown are sufficient to hit the vulnerable path.\nS:U - The bug corrupts or crashes kernel state within the same host security authority. It is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-scope boundary violation.\nC:H - The fix addresses a real use-after-free of struct smc_sock, not only a NULL dereference. Under the required kernel guidance, UAF is treated as enabling high confidentiality impact through potential reuse and disclosure primitives.\nI:H - The dangling smc_sock is dereferenced for fields including queued_smc_hs and ori_af_ops, and UAF of kernel heap objects can be shaped into control-flow or write primitives. Under the required kernel guidance, UAF warrants high integrity impact.\nA:H - The observed failure is a KASAN NULL dereference/oops in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), and the UAF path can also crash the kernel. Kernel oops or panic is high availability impact."
    }
  }
}
