{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2025-40111",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-40111"
  ],
  "published": "2025-11-12T01:07:37Z",
  "summary": "drm/vmwgfx: Fix Use-after-free in validation",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/vmwgfx: Fix Use-after-free in validation\n\nNodes stored in the validation duplicates hashtable come from an arena\nallocator that is cleared at the end of vmw_execbuf_process. All nodes\nare expected to be cleared in vmw_validation_drop_ht but this node escaped\nbecause its resource was destroyed prematurely.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.157",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40111"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1822e5287b7dfa59d0af966756ebf1dc652b60ee"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb7165e5f3b3b10721ff70553583ad12e90e447a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c918f9d1ccccc0e092f43dcb2d8266f54d7340b"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a8eaca539708ca532747f606d231f70e684e8ca"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/867bda5d95d36f10da398fd4409e21c7002b2332"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/655a2f29bfc21105c80bf8a7d7aafa6eca8b4496"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65608e991c2d771c13404e5c7ae122ac3c3357a4"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfe1323ab3c8a4dd5625ebfdba44dc47df84512a"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T12:19:11Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The vulnerability is reached only through `DRM_IOCTL_VMW_EXECBUF` on the vmwgfx DRM device node, which requires local execution to issue ioctls. There is no network or adjacent-network path into the command-submission validation code.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race \u2014 one thread loops `vmw_execbuf_ioctl()` over a DX context with bound resources while another destroys a bound view/shader/surface \u2014 and the window is widened because `vmw_resource_release()` drops the kref and then blocks on `binding_mutex` that the execbuf walker already holds. The attempt is infinitely repeatable, and a single success permanently poisons the device-global `res_ht`.\nPR:L - `DRM_IOCTL_VMW_EXECBUF` is marked `DRM_RENDER_ALLOW`, so any unprivileged local user holding an fd on `/dev/dri/renderD*` (the default for logged-in desktop users, GPU-enabled containers, and sandboxed GPU processes in VMware guests) can reach it. No capability, DRM master status, or authentication is needed.\nUI:N - The attacking process drives both the execbuf submission and the concurrent resource destruction entirely on its own via ioctls. No action by another user or administrator is required.\nS:U - The corruption is confined to the guest kernel's own memory within the same security authority; no hypervisor, IOMMU, or VM boundary is crossed even though vmwgfx is a paravirtual GPU driver.\nC:H - The stale hlist entry points into a page freed to the buddy allocator, so subsequent `hash_for_each_possible_rcu()` walks read attacker-groomed memory; a matching sprayed `hash->key` yields a fully fabricated `vmw_validation_res_node` whose `private` data is consumed as `struct vmw_ctx_validation_info` pointers, enabling arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - `hash_add_rcu()` writes a kernel pointer into the freed page through the dangling node's `pprev`, and a sprayed fake node supplies attacker-controlled `res`, `ctx`, and binding-state pointers that the binding/validation code dereferences and writes through \u2014 a use-after-free with both write and control-flow-hijack primitives.\nA:H - The dangling hash entry survives in the device-global `res_ht` and is traversed by every later execbuf from any process on that device, so a single trigger reliably produces list corruption and oopses/panics affecting the whole system."
    }
  }
}