{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2025-38601", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2025-38601" ], "published": "2025-08-19T17:19:12Z", "summary": "wifi: ath11k: clear initialized flag for deinit-ed srng lists", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath11k: clear initialized flag for deinit-ed srng lists\n\nIn a number of cases we see kernel panics on resume due\nto ath11k kernel page fault, which happens under the\nfollowing circumstances:\n\n1) First ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call\n\n Last interrupt received for each group:\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 22511ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14440788ms before\n [..]\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to receive control response completion, polling..\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: Service connect timeout\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to connect to HTT: -110\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to start core: -110\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: firmware crashed: MHI_CB_EE_RDDM\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: already resetting count 2\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to wait wlan mode request (mode 4): -110\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: qmi failed to send wlan mode off: -110\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to reconfigure driver on crash recovery\n [..]\n\n2) At this point reconfiguration fails (we have 2 resets) and\n ath11k_core_reconfigure_on_crash() calls ath11k_hal_srng_deinit()\n which destroys srng lists. However, it does not reset per-list\n ->initialized flag.\n\n3) Second ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call sees stale ->initialized\n flag and attempts to dump srng stats:\n\n Last interrupt received for each group:\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 66785ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14485062ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 2 14485062ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 3 14485062ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 4 14780845ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 5 14780845ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 6 14485062ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 7 66814ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 8 68997ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 9 67588ms before\n ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 10 69511ms before\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa007404eb010\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10022d067 PMD 100b01067 PTE 0\n Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\n RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k]\n Call Trace:\n \n ? __die_body+0xae/0xb0\n ? page_fault_oops+0x381/0x3e0\n ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0xa0\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n ? ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)]\n ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0xbd/0x1050 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)]\n worker_thread+0x389/0x930\n kthread+0x149/0x170\n\nClear per-list ->initialized flag in ath11k_hal_srng_deinit().", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": { "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e", "upstream_version": "6.1.47", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.1.148", "compiled_filter": false } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-38601" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a6daae987a829534636fd85ed6f84d5f0ad7fa4" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eff3bb53c18c0ed4ab6f43d412b3ed3aecad52d5" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/916ac18d526a26f6072866b1a97622cf1351ef1c" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bf201c55fdf303e79005038648dfa1e8af48f54" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72a48be1f53942793f3bc68a37fad1f38b53b082" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ebb5fe494501c19f31270008b26ab95201af6fd" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16872194c80f2724472fc207991712895ac8a230" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5b46aa7cf5f05c213316a018e49a8e086efd98e" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T12:19:11Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 8.8, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:A - The vulnerable state is reached through the ath11k firmware crash/recovery path, which an attacker within WiFi radio range can drive by injecting malformed 802.11 frames or operating a rogue AP that induces repeated firmware asserts. This matches the WiFi frame-injection adjacent-network vector rather than requiring local access.\nAC:L - The attacker controls the rate of induced firmware crashes, and it is exactly that flooding that produces the overlapping resets (\"already resetting count 2\") and QMI timeouts that make ath11k_core_reconfigure_on_crash() take the err_hal_srng_deinit path; the subsequent FW_INIT_DONE dump then reliably dereferences the stale pointers. No condition outside the attacker's influence is needed.\nPR:N - Inducing firmware asserts via 802.11 frames requires no account, association, or credentials on the victim system \u2014 management frames are processed pre-authentication, and an AP-mode ath11k device processes frames from unauthenticated clients.\nUI:N - No victim action is required; the device only needs to have its WiFi interface up, and the entire crash/recovery/dump sequence runs asynchronously in kernel workqueue context.\nS:U - The dangling-pointer dereference and its consequences are confined to the kernel's own security authority on the affected host; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - This is a use-after-free read: ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() dereferences stale tp_addr/hp_addr pointers into dma_free_coherent()'d memory that may already be recycled to other kernel allocations, and prints those words into the kernel log, disclosing freed kernel memory contents.\nI:H - The driver retains a fully populated srng_list of dangling pointers into freed DMA-coherent pages that are handed back to the allocator and reused by other subsystems; per kernel UAF scoring this dangling-pointer condition on recycled memory is treated as a high integrity impact.\nA:H - The demonstrated result is an unrecoverable kernel page fault/oops (\"BUG: unable to handle page fault ... Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI\") inside ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work on a worker thread, panicking the machine on resume and rendering the system unavailable." } } }