{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2025-38456",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-38456"
  ],
  "published": "2025-07-25T15:35:02Z",
  "summary": "ipmi:msghandler: Fix potential memory corruption in ipmi_create_user()",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipmi:msghandler: Fix potential memory corruption in ipmi_create_user()\n\nThe \"intf\" list iterator is an invalid pointer if the correct\n\"intf->intf_num\" is not found.  Calling atomic_dec(&intf->nr_users) on\nand invalid pointer will lead to memory corruption.\n\nWe don't really need to call atomic_dec() if we haven't called\natomic_add_return() so update the if (intf->in_shutdown) path as well.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.146",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-38456"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbc1670297f675854e982d23c8583900ff0cc67a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2d5c005dfc96fe857676d1d8ac46b29275cb89b"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e0d33e75c1604c3fad5586ad4dfa3b2695a3950"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c1a6ddb99858e7d68961f74ae27caeeeca67b6a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa332f5dc6fc662ad7d3200048772c96b861cf6b"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T12:19:11Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The only attacker-influenced entry point is `open(\"/dev/ipmiN\")` on the IPMI character device, which feeds `iminor(inode)` directly into `ipmi_create_user()`. No remote or adjacent-network data reaches this code path.\nAC:L - Once the attacker can open a device node whose minor has no live interface \u2014 a stale/extra node, or the wide window in `ipmi_unregister_smi()` between `list_del()` and `smi_gone()` destroying the node \u2014 the out-of-bounds `atomic_dec()` fires deterministically on every call, and can be repeated arbitrarily many times to decrement the target global by a chosen amount.\nPR:L - There is no `capable()`, LSM, or any other privilege check anywhere in `ipmi_open()` \u2192 `ipmi_create_user()`; the sole gate is filesystem permissions on `/dev/ipmiN`, which deployments routinely grant to a non-root management group or account for ipmitool/freeipmi-style tooling.\nUI:N - A single `open()` syscall by the attacker triggers the corruption; no victim action, mount, or file-open by another user is required.\nS:U - The corruption is of kernel `.data` and its consequences (privilege escalation, crash) stay within the kernel's own security authority, with no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\nC:H - The out-of-bounds write targets kernel globals adjacent to `ipmi_interfaces` \u2014 `list_head` and `struct mutex` objects \u2014 and corrupting a list pointer's low word yields a traversable wild pointer usable as a kernel memory read primitive, so full confidentiality loss is achievable.\nI:H - This is a controlled out-of-bounds write: a repeatable decrement at a fixed, known kernel-global address, letting the attacker set that word to an arbitrary lower value and thereby corrupt lock ownership or global list pointers into an arbitrary-write primitive and control-flow hijack.\nA:H - Corrupting the module's global mutex owner and list-head state leads to lock-state confusion, deadlock, or an oops/panic on the next traversal, giving a complete denial of service."
    }
  }
}