{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2025-38264",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-38264"
  ],
  "published": "2025-07-09T10:43:51Z",
  "summary": "nvme-tcp: sanitize request list handling",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme-tcp: sanitize request list handling\n\nValidate the request in nvme_tcp_handle_r2t() to ensure it's not part of\nany list, otherwise a malicious R2T PDU might inject a loop in request\nlist processing.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": null,
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-38264"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78a4adcd3fedb0728436e8094848ebf4c6bae006"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f054ea62598197714a6ca7b3b387a027308f8b13"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bf04c874fcb1ae46a863034296e4b33d8fbd66c"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T12:19:11Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - The vulnerable code is the NVMe-over-TCP host driver's PDU receive path, parsing an R2T PDU sent by a remote NVMe-oF target over TCP (port 4420); the malicious input arrives purely over the network from a compromised/rogue target or an on-path attacker.\nAC:L - The target fully controls PDU content and timing \u2014 placing two R2T PDUs for the same command_id in a single TCP segment guarantees both are processed inside one nvme_tcp_recv_skb() pass with no send-path progress between them, creating the llist cycle deterministically with no race to win and no memory-layout dependency.\nPR:N - NVMe/TCP requires no authentication by default (TLS and DH-HMAC-CHAP are optional, off in stock configs), so the remote peer needs zero privileges or credentials on the victim host \u2014 it simply answers I/O it is already being sent.\nUI:N - No victim action is required; once the host is connected to the target, ordinary filesystem/block I/O generates the in-flight commands and the malicious target triggers the bug on its own by replying with duplicate R2T PDUs.\nS:U - The corruption and the resulting hang are confined to the host kernel's own memory and scheduling authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Beyond the list corruption, duplicate queueing lets the RX path reset req->state/offset/pdu_len while the TX path is consuming the request, desynchronizing req->iter so nvme_tcp_req_cur_page() reads past the bvec array and sock_sendmsg() splices unintended kernel pages directly to the attacker-controlled socket.\nI:H - Attacker-controlled input produces kernel linked-list pointer corruption (double llist_add plus repeated list_add of an already-linked entry into send_list) and lets an in-flight request's PDU header, ttag, and iterator state be rewritten mid-transfer, which is memory/state corruption leverageable for further control over kernel structures.\nA:H - The injected cycle makes nvme_tcp_process_req_list() spin forever in the nvme_tcp_wq kworker while holding queue->send_mutex with no cond_resched(), producing a CPU soft lockup, RCU stalls, and a permanently wedged storage queue \u2014 a deterministic, unauthenticated remote kernel hang."
    }
  }
}