{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2025-37917", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2025-37917" ], "published": "2025-05-20T15:22:31Z", "summary": "net: ethernet: mtk-star-emac: fix spinlock recursion issues on rx/tx poll", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ethernet: mtk-star-emac: fix spinlock recursion issues on rx/tx poll\n\nUse spin_lock_irqsave and spin_unlock_irqrestore instead of spin_lock\nand spin_unlock in mtk_star_emac driver to avoid spinlock recursion\noccurrence that can happen when enabling the DMA interrupts again in\nrx/tx poll.\n\n```\nBUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, swapper/0/0\n lock: 0xffff00000db9cf20, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: swapper/0/0,\n .owner_cpu: 0\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted\n 6.15.0-rc2-next-20250417-00001-gf6a27738686c-dirty #28 PREEMPT\nHardware name: MediaTek MT8365 Open Platform EVK (DT)\nCall trace:\n show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)\n dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80\n dump_stack+0x18/0x24\n spin_dump+0x78/0x88\n do_raw_spin_lock+0x11c/0x120\n _raw_spin_lock+0x20/0x2c\n mtk_star_handle_irq+0xc0/0x22c [mtk_star_emac]\n __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x48/0x140\n handle_irq_event+0x4c/0xb0\n handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa0/0x1bc\n handle_irq_desc+0x34/0x58\n generic_handle_domain_irq+0x1c/0x28\n gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x120\n do_interrupt_handler+0x50/0x84\n el1_interrupt+0x34/0x68\n el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24\n el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70\n regmap_mmio_read32le+0xc/0x20 (P)\n _regmap_bus_reg_read+0x6c/0xac\n _regmap_read+0x60/0xdc\n regmap_read+0x4c/0x80\n mtk_star_rx_poll+0x2f4/0x39c [mtk_star_emac]\n __napi_poll+0x38/0x188\n net_rx_action+0x164/0x2c0\n handle_softirqs+0x100/0x244\n __do_softirq+0x14/0x20\n ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20\n call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x64\n do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x40\n __irq_exit_rcu+0xd4/0x10c\n irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x1c\n el1_interrupt+0x38/0x68\n el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24\n el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70\n cpuidle_enter_state+0xac/0x320 (P)\n cpuidle_enter+0x38/0x50\n do_idle+0x1e4/0x260\n cpu_startup_entry+0x34/0x3c\n rest_init+0xdc/0xe0\n console_on_rootfs+0x0/0x6c\n __primary_switched+0x88/0x90\n```", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": { "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e", "upstream_version": "6.1.47", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.1.138", "compiled_filter": false } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-37917" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bedd287fdd3142dffad7ae2ac6ef15f4a2ad0629" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94107259f972d2fd896dbbcaa176b3b2451ff9e5" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7cb10f17bddc415f30fbc00a4e2b490e0d94c462" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d40bf73fa7f31eac2b0a7c9d85de67df82ee7f3" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d886f8d85494d12b2752fd7c6c32162d982d5dd5" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fe0866014486736cc3ba1c6fd4606d3dbe55c9c" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T12:19:11Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 7.5, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:N - The race is driven entirely by Ethernet frame reception and the resulting transmit-completion interrupts on the MAC, so any remote peer able to send routed packets to the affected interface (these SoCs are commonly IoT/embedded gateways) can drive it. No local access is needed.\nAC:L - The attacker creates both sides of the race by flooding the interface: inbound frames schedule RX NAPI while the host's replies generate TX-complete interrupts that hit the same CPU during the lock-held MMIO window, and the flood can be sustained indefinitely until the collision occurs (it was observed during ordinary traffic testing).\nPR:N - The code path is the driver's packet receive/transmit interrupt and NAPI handling, executed on any incoming frame with no authentication, credentials, or capability check whatsoever.\nUI:N - No victim action is required; the deadlock occurs in interrupt/softirq context purely as a result of attacker-generated traffic.\nS:U - The deadlock is confined to the kernel of the affected host and does not cross into another security authority such as a hypervisor or IOMMU boundary.\nC:N - The lock protects only a read-modify-write of the interrupt-mask register; the recursion causes a hang and exposes no memory contents or kernel data to the attacker.\nI:N - No memory corruption, out-of-bounds access, or data modification results from the spinlock recursion \u2014 the CPU simply spins on a lock it already holds.\nA:H - The self-deadlock wedges the CPU in interrupt context while holding priv->lock, producing a spinlock-recursion BUG and a hard lockup that stalls networking and typically hangs the system." } } }