{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2025-22087", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2025-22087" ], "published": "2025-04-16T14:14:59Z", "summary": "bpf: Fix array bounds error with may_goto", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix array bounds error with may_goto\n\nmay_goto uses an additional 8 bytes on the stack, which causes the\ninterpreters[] array to go out of bounds when calculating index by\nstack_size.\n\n1. If a BPF program is rewritten, re-evaluate the stack size. For non-JIT\ncases, reject loading directly.\n\n2. For non-JIT cases, calculating interpreters[idx] may still cause\nout-of-bounds array access, and just warn about it.\n\n3. For jit_requested cases, the execution of bpf_func also needs to be\nwarned. So move the definition of function __bpf_prog_ret0_warn out of\nthe macro definition CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON.", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1~bpo12+1": { "linux_commit": "cd231d4775b14f228606c09f219b48308f6ab3aa", "upstream_version": "6.12.20", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.12.23" } } } }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:13", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1~bpo12+1", "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1", "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1~bpo12+1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.19+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.12.20+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1~bpo12+1": { "linux_commit": "121c2c384b9c2f4790ffb31b2cd25c7d75c8fda0", "upstream_version": "6.12.19", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.12.23" }, "1:6.12.19-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "121c2c384b9c2f4790ffb31b2cd25c7d75c8fda0", "upstream_version": "6.12.19", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.12.23" }, "1:6.12.20-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "cd231d4775b14f228606c09f219b48308f6ab3aa", "upstream_version": "6.12.20", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.12.23" } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-22087" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19e6817f84000d0b06f09fd69ebd56217842c122" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4524b7febdd55fb99ae2e1f48db64019fa69e643" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a86ae57b2600e5749f5f674e9d4296ac00c69a8" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ebc5030e0c5a698f1dd9a6684cddf6ccaed64a0" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T12:19:11Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 7.8, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:L - The vulnerability is reached through the `bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD)` syscall and triggered by running the loaded program (e.g. via `SO_ATTACH_BPF` on a local socket). No network-facing service parses attacker data to reach this code.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls both inputs to the faulty index computation \u2014 a program that uses exactly 512 bytes of stack plus a single `may_goto` instruction deterministically yields `interpreters[16]` on every attempt. No race, timing, or uncontrolled memory-layout condition is involved.\nPR:L - Loading a BPF program requires only an unprivileged local account on systems where `kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=0` (socket-filter/cgroup_skb types load without CAP_BPF), and `may_goto` has no additional capability gate in the verifier. No root or administrative privilege is needed.\nUI:N - The attacker loads and triggers the BPF program entirely on their own; no victim action, mount, or file open is required.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds access and the resulting corrupted control flow are confined to the kernel's own security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - An out-of-bounds read past `interpreters[]` yields a function pointer that is then invoked, causing the BPF interpreter to execute uncontrolled memory as bytecode with unbounded `BPF_LDX` loads, which can be leveraged to disclose arbitrary kernel memory.\nI:H - The wrongly-typed indirect call runs `___bpf_prog_run()` over an uninitialized instruction pointer, so `BPF_STX`/`BPF_ST` stores and `BPF_CALL` dispatches operate on unvalidated addresses \u2014 a memory-corruption and control-flow-hijack primitive.\nA:H - In the common case the bogus interpreter entry hits `BUG_ON(1)` on an unknown opcode or faults on a wild pointer, producing a kernel oops/panic that any local user can trigger on demand." } } }