{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-58239",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-58239"
  ],
  "published": "2025-08-22T13:01:30Z",
  "summary": "tls: stop recv() if initial process_rx_list gave us non-DATA",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: stop recv() if initial process_rx_list gave us non-DATA\n\nIf we have a non-DATA record on the rx_list and another record of the\nsame type still on the queue, we will end up merging them:\n - process_rx_list copies the non-DATA record\n - we start the loop and process the first available record since it's\n   of the same type\n - we break out of the loop since the record was not DATA\n\nJust check the record type and jump to the end in case process_rx_list\ndid some work.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.80",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-58239"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f310143961e2d9a0479fca117ce869f8aaecc140"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31e10d6cb0c9532ff070cf50da1657c3acee9276"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4338032aa90bd1d5b33a4274e8fa8347cda5ee09"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6756168add1c6c3ef1c32c335bb843a5d1f99a75"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b952d8fdfcf6fd8ea0b8954bc9277642cf0977f"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4ed943882a8fc057ea5a67643314245e048bbdd"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdfbaec5923d9359698cbb286bc0deadbb717504"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.2,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:N - The bug lives in net/tls (kTLS) receive processing and is driven entirely by the sequence and types of TLS records a remote peer transmits over the network. Any kTLS-enabled endpoint (OpenSSL/nginx offload, NVMe-TCP target, NFS/RPC-with-TLS, tlshd-provisioned sockets) is reachable from the network.\nAC:L - The attacker simply sends two same-type non-DATA records back-to-back, and can force the required \"leftover record on rx_list\" precondition by making the first control record larger than the reader's buffer (partially_consumed \u2192 put_on_rx_list). There is no race, no memory-layout dependency, and no timing window to win.\nPR:N - The attacker only needs to be the TLS peer on an established session; on a public kTLS server the handshake is server-authenticated only, so any anonymous client can complete it and then emit arbitrary post-handshake alert/handshake records. No privileges or accounts on the target host are required.\nUI:N - The vulnerable path is the target's ordinary recvmsg() server loop; no victim action beyond normal socket reads is needed. The remote peer triggers it purely by its own record transmission pattern.\nS:U - The consequences are confined to the affected socket and the kernel/process security authority that owns it. No VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:N - Only the attacker's own decrypted record payload is delivered to the consumer; all copies remain bounded by the caller-supplied len, so no kernel memory, uninitialized data, or other-session content is exposed.\nI:L - A remote peer can make the kernel coalesce two distinct TLS control records into one recvmsg() under a single TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE cmsg with no intervening record boundary, corrupting the protocol message stream handed to the consumer \u2014 e.g. tls_alert_recv() parses only the first two bytes, letting a fatal alert be hidden behind a preceding warning alert. The modification is real but limited to attacker-supplied control-message framing, not arbitrary data or control-flow.\nA:H - With MSG_WAITALL, target is derived from the full requested length before len -= copied, so after process_rx_list returns a complete control record the loop re-enters tls_rx_rec_wait() and blocks indefinitely (default SO_RCVTIMEO of 0) instead of returning the record. The wedged reader holds ctx->reader_present, so every other thread reading that socket also stalls in tls_rx_reader_acquire(), and a remote peer can repeat this across connections to hang service threads."
    }
  }
}