{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-53207", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2024-53207" ], "published": "2024-12-27T13:53:01Z", "summary": "Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible deadlocks", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible deadlocks\n\nThis fixes possible deadlocks like the following caused by\nhci_cmd_sync_dequeue causing the destroy function to run:\n\n INFO: task kworker/u19:0:143 blocked for more than 120 seconds.\n Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-2024-03-19-intel-next-iLS-24ww14 #1\n \"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs\" disables this message.\n task:kworker/u19:0 state:D stack:0 pid:143 tgid:143 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000\n Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth]\n Call Trace:\n \n __schedule+0x374/0xaf0\n schedule+0x3c/0xf0\n schedule_preempt_disabled+0x1c/0x30\n __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x3ef/0x7a0\n __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20\n mutex_lock+0x3c/0x50\n mgmt_set_connectable_complete+0xa4/0x150 [bluetooth]\n ? kfree+0x211/0x2a0\n hci_cmd_sync_dequeue+0xae/0x130 [bluetooth]\n ? __pfx_cmd_complete_rsp+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth]\n cmd_complete_rsp+0x26/0x80 [bluetooth]\n mgmt_pending_foreach+0x4d/0x70 [bluetooth]\n __mgmt_power_off+0x8d/0x180 [bluetooth]\n ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x23/0x40\n hci_dev_close_sync+0x445/0x5b0 [bluetooth]\n hci_set_powered_sync+0x149/0x250 [bluetooth]\n set_powered_sync+0x24/0x60 [bluetooth]\n hci_cmd_sync_work+0x90/0x150 [bluetooth]\n process_one_work+0x13e/0x300\n worker_thread+0x2f7/0x420\n ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n kthread+0x107/0x140\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x60\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30\n ", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.6.62-1+rpt1" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.6.62+rpt-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.6.62-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.6.62+rpt-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.6.62-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.6.62+rpt-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.6.62-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.6.62+rpt-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.6.62-1+rpt1" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.6.62+rpt-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.6.62-1+rpt1" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.6.62-1+rpt1": { "linux_commit": "dd2394360860d15146c96635796a75b05bb32b61", "upstream_version": "6.6.62", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.6.64" } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-53207" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3f594a3473d6429a0bcf2004cb2885368741b79" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5703fb1d85f653e35b327b14de4db7da239e4fd9" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a25ce9b4af6dc26ee2b9c32d6bd37620bf9739e" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cac34e44281f1f1bd842adbbcfe3ef9ff0905111" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a66dfaf18fd61bb75ef8cee83db46b2aadf153d0" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 7.8, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:L - The vulnerability is reached by writing MGMT commands to a local AF_BLUETOOTH/BTPROTO_HCI socket bound to HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL (hci_sock_sendmsg \u2192 hci_mgmt_cmd), plus the HCIDEVDOWN ioctl path; no over-the-air Bluetooth traffic is involved.\nAC:L - The attacker drives both halves from the same socket \u2014 issue SET_POWERED(off), whose hci_dev_close_sync does workqueue drains and controller shutdown commands, then queue a second cmd_sync entry into that window \u2014 and can retry the sequence indefinitely until it lands.\nPR:L - Sending these MGMT opcodes requires the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED flag (CAP_NET_ADMIN), which on real deployments is held by the Bluetooth daemon/stack process (bluetoothd, Android AID_BLUETOOTH) rather than full root, so a compromised low-privileged Bluetooth service reaches this directly.\nUI:N - The entire sequence is driven by the attacker's own MGMT socket writes; no victim action or interaction is needed.\nS:U - The deadlock and memory corruption are confined to the kernel's own security authority \u2014 there is no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary crossed.\nC:H - Callbacks such as start_discovery_complete and read_local_oob_ext_data_complete free the mgmt_pending_cmd, after which cmd_complete_rsp reads cmd->cmd_complete from the freed GFP_KERNEL slab object; a heap-sprayed reclaim of that object yields a controlled read primitive and disclosure of kernel memory.\nI:H - The stale cmd is dereferenced for an indirect function-pointer call (cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, status)) and then passed to mgmt_pending_remove a second time, giving a double free plus list_del on freed memory \u2014 a control-flow-hijack and arbitrary-write primitive.\nA:H - mgmt_set_connectable_complete/mgmt_set_discoverable_complete re-acquire hdev->lock already held by hci_dev_close_sync, permanently deadlocking the hci_cmd_sync_work kworker while holding that mutex, and the UAF/double-free path independently corrupts the slab and panics the kernel." } } }