{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-53106",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-53106"
  ],
  "published": "2024-12-02T13:53:05Z",
  "summary": "ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common\n\nFunction ima_eventdigest_init() calls ima_eventdigest_init_common()\nwith HASH_ALGO__LAST which is then used to access the array\nhash_digest_size[] leading to buffer overrun. Have a conditional\nstatement to handle this.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.119",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-53106"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e01aae58e818503f2ffcd34c6f7dc6f90af1057e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a84765c62cc0469864e2faee43aae253ad16082"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ecf0df5205cfb0907eb7984b8671257965a5232"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/923168a0631bc42fffd55087b337b1b6c54dcff5"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.3,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - Triggering requires local file operations \u2014 an unprivileged process holding a file open for write while another mmap()s it PROT_EXEC \u2014 to generate an IMA integrity violation record. There is no network-facing path to `ima_rdwr_violation_check()`.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls both processes and both files involved, so violation records can be generated deterministically and repeatedly with a few syscalls. Nothing about the trigger depends on timing, memory layout, or victim state the attacker cannot influence.\nPR:L - The built-in default measurement policy applies `MEASURE func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC` to all users with no uid gate, so any unprivileged local account can drive `ima_add_violation()` on a file it owns. No capability, namespace trick, or root access is needed.\nUI:N - The attacker's own two processes perform every step (open for write, mmap PROT_EXEC); no other user or administrator has to act. Exploitation is entirely self-contained.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read, the leaked data, and the crash all occur within the kernel's own security authority. No VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - The bogus length drives `memcpy()` far past a ~201-byte stack buffer, copying adjacent kernel stack memory into the measurement entry, which `ima_print_digest()` renders in hex to securityfs and which is exported to remote attestation verifiers \u2014 an unbounded kernel memory disclosure that can expose stack canaries and KASLR-defeating pointers. The read is not bounded to a few bytes.\nI:L - There is no out-of-bounds write \u2014 the kzalloc'd destination is sized to the bogus length \u2014 so no arbitrary-write or control-flow primitive exists. The integrity impact is limited to falsifying IMA measurement-log entries and the TPM PCR extend values, corrupting the attestation record.\nA:H - The oversized `memcpy()` from a stack buffer triggers `fortify_panic()` on CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE builds, a VMAP_STACK guard-page fault for large lengths, or a KASAN stack-out-of-bounds report; an out-of-range value additionally causes a `kzalloc` order WARN. Any of these is a kernel crash, and an unprivileged user can trigger it at will."
    }
  }
}