{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-53082",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-53082"
  ],
  "published": "2024-11-19T17:45:17Z",
  "summary": "virtio_net: Add hash_key_length check",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio_net: Add hash_key_length check\n\nAdd hash_key_length check in virtnet_probe() to avoid possible out of\nbound errors when setting/reading the hash key.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.117",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-53082"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3401e3c8d339ddb6ccb2e3d11ad634b7846a806"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af0aa8aecbe8985079232902894cc4cb62795691"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a18a783b1fa590ad1ed785907263e4b86adcfe2"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f7d9c1964fcd16d02a8a9d4fd6f6cb60c4cc530"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.4,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The malicious value arrives in the virtio device's configuration space read over the PCI/MMIO transport during driver probe, not over any network or wireless path; the attacker is the local device model (hypervisor backend, vDPA/VDUSE device, or hardware virtio NIC). This matches the AV:L used for the analogous device-supplied-config OOB in CVE-2024-53092.\nAC:L - The device simply advertises rss_max_key_size > 40 and the overflow is deterministic on every probe \u2014 no race, no timing window, and the attacker picks the exact overflow length and (via ethtool set_rxfh) the exact bytes written past the array.\nPR:N - The out-of-bounds write and the BUG_ON panic occur automatically inside virtnet_probe()/virtnet_init_default_rss() during driver binding, and virtnet_commit_rss_command() DMAs the out-of-bounds key bytes back to the device on link-up, all with no guest account or credentials required.\nUI:N - Device probe, hotplug, and interface bring-up are driven automatically by the driver core and normal network configuration; no victim action is needed.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and write are confined to the guest kernel's own heap and security authority, with no IOMMU, hypervisor, or sandbox boundary crossed by the impact itself.\nC:H - virtnet_get_rxfh() memcpy's vi->rss_key_size bytes from the 40-byte key array to userspace and virtnet_commit_rss_command() hands the same over-long buffer to the device, leaking adjacent virtnet_info heap contents including the indirection_table kernel pointer; once that pointer is overwritten via set_rxfh, get_rxfh reads back arbitrary kernel addresses.\nI:H - netdev_rss_key_fill() writes past key[] at probe and virtnet_set_rxfh()'s memcpy(vi->rss.key, rxfh->key, vi->rss_key_size) writes attacker-chosen bytes over the adjacent indirection_table pointer, after which vi->rss.indirection_table[i] = rxfh->indir[i] is an arbitrary kernel write suitable for control-flow hijacking; on 6.1/6.6 key[] is the last struct member so the overflow lands directly on subsequent virtnet_info fields.\nA:H - netdev_rss_key_fill() contains BUG_ON(len > 52), so any device advertising rss_max_key_size of 53\u2013255 panics the guest kernel outright during probe, and the corrupted indirection_table pointer additionally trips sg_set_buf()'s virt_addr_valid BUG_ON and wild dereferences."
    }
  }
}