{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-49571",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-49571"
  ],
  "published": "2025-01-11T12:37:33Z",
  "summary": "net/smc: check iparea_offset and ipv6_prefixes_cnt when receiving proposal msg",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: check iparea_offset and ipv6_prefixes_cnt when receiving proposal msg\n\nWhen receiving proposal msg in server, the field iparea_offset\nand the field ipv6_prefixes_cnt in proposal msg are from the\nremote client and can not be fully trusted. Especially the\nfield iparea_offset, once exceed the max value, there has the\nchance to access wrong address, and crash may happen.\n\nThis patch checks iparea_offset and ipv6_prefixes_cnt before using them.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.122",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-49571"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/846bada23bfcdeb83621b045ed85dc06c7833ff0"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f10635268a0a49ee902a3b63b5dbb76f4fed498e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62056d1592e63d85e82357ee2ae6a6a294f440b0"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91a7c27c1444ed4677b83fd5308d2cf03f5f0851"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47ce46349672a7e0c361bfe39ed0b22e824ef4fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a29e220d3c8edbf0e1beb0f028878a4a85966556"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.1,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - The malformed CLC Proposal is received over a routable TCP connection by the in-kernel SMC listener (`smc_listen_work()`), with all attacker-controlled fields (`iparea_offset`, `ipv6_prefixes_cnt`, `hdr.length`, `typev1`) coming straight off the wire. Any remote host that can reach an SMC-enabled listening socket can deliver it.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls every field involved; no race, memory grooming, or unpredictable state is needed, and the only variable \u2014 the server's IP prefix length for `smc_clc_prfx_match4_rcu()` \u2014 is brute-forceable in at most 32 connections. The OOB read in `smc_clc_msg_prop_valid()` triggers on the very first packet with no preconditions at all.\nPR:N - The CLC handshake is the first exchange after TCP accept and SMC performs no authentication whatsoever, so the vulnerable parsing runs entirely pre-authentication. The attacker needs only the ability to complete a TCP handshake with the SMC experimental option set.\nUI:N - The server-side listen worker parses the proposal automatically upon connection; no action by any local user or administrator is required. A single unsolicited connection suffices.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds reads and the NULL dereference occur within the kernel's own memory and security authority, with no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary. Impact is confined to the kernel that parsed the message.\nC:H - `iparea_offset` lets the prefix pointer land up to ~64 KB past a ~656-byte kmalloc-1k object, and the OOB-read `ipv6_prefixes_cnt` is checked for equality against the attacker's own `hdr->length`, making success remotely observable \u2014 a byte-granular read oracle over a large window of adjacent kernel heap (kernel pointers, other sockets' data). `smc_clc_prfx_match()` reads ~144 further OOB bytes and reflects the result back as a decline reason, so this is far more than a strictly bounded few-byte read.\nI:N - The out-of-bounds pointer is only ever dereferenced for reads (`smc_clc_msg_prop_valid()`, `smc_clc_prfx_match4_rcu()`/`match6_rcu()`), and the additional defect is a NULL-pointer read; no attacker-controlled data is written out of bounds and no control-flow hijack primitive arises.\nA:H - With `typev1=SMC_TYPE_D` and `iparea_offset != 40`, `smc_find_ism_v1_device_serv()` dereferences a NULL `pclc_smcd`, oopsing the `smc_hs_wq` worker while `smc_server_lgr_pending` and the socket lock are held and never released, permanently deadlocking all further SMC server handshakes; the far OOB read can also fault on unmapped memory, and `panic_on_oops` turns either into a full system panic."
    }
  }
}