{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-49568",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-49568"
  ],
  "published": "2025-01-11T12:37:33Z",
  "summary": "net/smc: check v2_ext_offset/eid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt when receiving proposal msg",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: check v2_ext_offset/eid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt when receiving proposal msg\n\nWhen receiving proposal msg in server, the fields v2_ext_offset/\neid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt in proposal msg are from the remote client\nand can not be fully trusted. Especially the field v2_ext_offset,\nonce exceed the max value, there has the chance to access wrong\naddress, and crash may happen.\n\nThis patch checks the fields v2_ext_offset/eid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt\nbefore using them.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.189",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-49568"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cc0170ae646876aa5de2f0cad3066ce53e86f27"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49798283fce4c1a24fb1ba4c7c39127739535571"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/690b9a8db9460d065785548e43fd6a02d247c1b7"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/295a92e3df32e72aff0f4bc25c310e349d07ffbf"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42f6beb2d5779429417b5f8115a4e3fa695d2a6c"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7863c9f3d24ba49dbead7e03dfbe40deb5888fdf"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-10-03T11:04:09Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - The malformed CLC proposal arrives as ordinary TCP payload from a remote peer on an SMC-enabled listening socket and is parsed by `smc_listen_work()`/`smc_clc_wait_msg()`. No local access or network adjacency is needed \u2014 any host that can reach the listener can trigger it.\nAC:L - The attacker controls every field involved (`version`, `typev1`, `typev2`, `iparea_offset`, `v2_ext_offset`) and an 8-byte payload deterministically produces the NULL dereference; the wild-pointer variant needs only a chosen 16-bit offset. No race, no memory-layout precondition, no state outside the attacker's control.\nPR:N - The CLC handshake runs immediately after the TCP three-way handshake, entirely before any application-level authentication, and `smc_clc_msg_prop_valid()` is the first validation performed on the peer's data. An unauthenticated remote attacker reaches it.\nUI:N - The kernel's listen worker parses the proposal automatically on connection accept; no local user or administrator action is required.\nS:U - The wild-pointer reads, writes and crash all occur within the kernel's own security authority; no VM, IOMMU or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - `v2_ext_offset` up to 65535 (vs. a legitimate max of 172) points the parser up to ~64 KB past a ~676-byte slab object, and the OOB-read `smcd_v2_ext_offset` extends that another 64 KB; `smc_clc_match_eid()` scans up to 8 KB of it and the OOB-read `max_conns`/`max_links` are negotiated and reflected back to the attacker. This is a wide, attacker-directed kernel memory read, not a bounded few-byte leak.\nI:H - Removing the `ism_gid_cnt` bound lets `smc_check_ism_v2_match()` write attacker-supplied 64-bit GIDs, `smcd_dev` pointers and CHIDs past the 9-element `ism_peer_gid`/`ism_dev`/`ism_chid` arrays in the kzalloc'd `struct smc_init_info` on hosts with \u226510 SMC-D devices, and uncontrolled OOB-read bytes (`roce[]`, `system_eid`, GIDs) are installed as the link group's RDMA/ISM connection parameters.\nA:H - An 8-byte packet yields a guaranteed NULL-pointer oops in the `smc_hs_wq` worker while `lock_sock()` is held (full panic under `panic_on_oops`), and the wild-pointer faults occur while holding the global `smc_server_lgr_pending` mutex, permanently deadlocking every subsequent SMC server handshake. It is repeatable at will from an unauthenticated connection."
    }
  }
}