{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-47408",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-47408"
  ],
  "published": "2025-01-11T12:37:33Z",
  "summary": "net/smc: check smcd_v2_ext_offset when receiving proposal msg",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: check smcd_v2_ext_offset when receiving proposal msg\n\nWhen receiving proposal msg in server, the field smcd_v2_ext_offset in\nproposal msg is from the remote client and can not be fully trusted.\nOnce the value of smcd_v2_ext_offset exceed the max value, there has\nthe chance to access wrong address, and crash may happen.\n\nThis patch checks the value of smcd_v2_ext_offset before using it.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.122",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-47408"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35da53027c1f2efdd7d0177dc00584134204761a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a36364d8d4fabb105001f992fb8ff2d3546203d6"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1cc8be2a785a8f1ce1f597f3e608602c5fccd46"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/935caf324b445fe73d7708fae6f7176fb243f357"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48d5a8a304a643613dab376a278f29d3e22f7c34"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ab332deb671d8f7e66d82a2ff2b3f715bc3a4ad"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-10-03T11:04:09Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 9.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "Critical",
      "scenario": "AV:N - The malformed CLC Proposal is delivered as ordinary TCP payload to an SMC-enabled listening socket and parsed by `smc_listen_work()`/`smc_clc_wait_msg()`; every field involved (`smcd_v2_ext_offset`, `hdr.length`, `typev1/typev2`, `ism_gid_cnt`) comes straight off the wire. Any host that can route to the listener can trigger it.\nAC:L - A single proposal with a chosen 16-bit `smcd_v2_ext_offset` deterministically moves the pointer up to ~64 KB past the 656-byte buffer, with no race, no timing window, and no state outside the attacker's control; the attacker can sweep all 65535 offsets across successive connections. The ISM-device precondition is the target's normal SMC-D configuration, not an attacker-uncontrollable condition.\nPR:N - The CLC handshake runs immediately after the TCP three-way handshake and entirely before any application-level authentication or authorization. An unauthenticated remote attacker only needs to open a TCP connection to the SMC listener.\nUI:N - The proposal is processed automatically by the kernel listen worker as part of the SMC handshake. No action by any local user or administrator is needed.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds access and its consequences are confined to the kernel's own memory and the SMC subsystem on the target host. No VM, IOMMU, or other security-authority boundary is crossed.\nC:H - The read reaches an attacker-chosen offset up to ~64 KB beyond the slab object \u2014 far from \"strictly bounded to a few bytes\" \u2014 and the OOB bytes are compared against local ISM CHIDs/GIDs and the system EID, giving a remote, repeatable oracle over kernel heap contents at chosen offsets. Groomed heap data reaching `smcd_lgr_match()` can also attach the attacker to another peer's link group and its shared DMB.\nI:H - The out-of-bounds bytes are stored into `ini->ism_peer_gid[]` and directly drive link-group reuse in `smc_conn_create()` via `smcd_lgr_match()`, so heap-groomable values let an attacker bind their connection into a different peer's existing SMC-D link group and shared memory buffer, corrupting that peer's connection state. The wild pointer is also fully attacker-steered across a 64 KB window.\nA:H - The wild dereference occurs in the `smc_hs_wq` worker while holding both `smc_server_lgr_pending` and `smcd_dev_list.mutex`; an unmapped or KASAN-poisoned target oopses the worker with both global mutexes permanently held, hanging all further SMC handshakes and ISM device registration, and panicking the box outright under `panic_on_oops`."
    }
  }
}