{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-46673",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-46673"
  ],
  "published": "2024-09-13T05:30:51Z",
  "summary": "scsi: aacraid: Fix double-free on probe failure",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: aacraid: Fix double-free on probe failure\n\naac_probe_one() calls hardware-specific init functions through the\naac_driver_ident::init pointer, all of which eventually call down to\naac_init_adapter().\n\nIf aac_init_adapter() fails after allocating memory for aac_dev::queues,\nit frees the memory but does not clear that member.\n\nAfter the hardware-specific init function returns an error,\naac_probe_one() goes down an error path that frees the memory pointed to\nby aac_dev::queues, resulting.in a double-free.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.108",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-46673"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d237c7d06ffddcdb5d36948c527dc01284388218"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/564e1986b00c5f05d75342f8407f75f0a17b94df"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e96dea7eff6f2bbcd0b42a098012fc66af9eb69"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85449b28ff6a89c4513115e43ddcad949b5890c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60962c3d8e18e5d8dfa16df788974dd7f35bd87a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a3995a3ffeca280a961b59f5c99843d81b15929"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b540ec7c0045c2d01c4e479f34bbc8f147afa4c"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/919ddf8336f0b84c0453bac583808c9f165a85c2"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The vulnerable code is a PCI probe/adapter-reset path for a local Adaptec RAID HBA, reached only from local driver bind, the `/dev/aacN` ioctl, sysfs `reset_host`, or SCSI error handling. No remote or adjacent-network input reaches it.\nAC:L - Triggering requires the adapter re-init to hit an allocation failure at `aac_comm_init()`/`aac_fib_setup()` while a probe or host-reset is in flight; an attacker able to invoke the reset path can loop it while driving DMA32 memory pressure, controlling both sides and retrying until the ENOMEM window lands.\nPR:L - Once `dev->queues` is left dangling, any local user can drive the paths that dereference and re-free it (ioctl handling, I/O to the array); a plain unprivileged local account is sufficient to supply the memory pressure and to reuse the freed slab object.\nUI:N - No victim action is needed \u2014 the free and the subsequent reuse/second free happen inside the driver's own error unwind and interrupt/kthread contexts.\nS:U - The corruption is confined to kernel slab memory managed by the same kernel security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - The stale `dev->queues` is read by the interrupt handlers, the command kthread, and the ioctl path after the object is freed, and the double free lets an attacker place a controlled object at that address \u2014 yielding disclosure of arbitrary reallocated kernel data.\nI:H - Freed memory is written through the dangling pointer (queue head/tail indices, list_head links, atomics) and the double free hands the attacker the classic two-owners-of-one-slab-object primitive, which is escalatable to arbitrary kernel write and control-flow hijack.\nA:H - A `kfree()` of an already-freed pointer trips SLUB freelist-hardening `BUG()` or corrupts the freelist, and the dangling `dev->queues` dereference from interrupt context reliably oopses \u2014 a full kernel panic on the storage controller."
    }
  }
}