{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-42301", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2024-42301" ], "published": "2024-08-17T09:11:20Z", "summary": "dev/parport: fix the array out-of-bounds risk", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndev/parport: fix the array out-of-bounds risk\n\nFixed array out-of-bounds issues caused by sprintf\nby replacing it with snprintf for safer data copying,\nensuring the destination buffer is not overflowed.\n\nBelow is the stack trace I encountered during the actual issue:\n\n[ 66.575408s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,4]Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector:\nKernel stack is corrupted in: do_hardware_base_addr+0xcc/0xd0 [parport]\n[ 66.575408s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,5]CPU: 4 PID: 5118 Comm:\nQThread Tainted: G S W O 5.10.97-arm64-desktop #7100.57021.2\n[ 66.575439s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,6]TGID: 5087 Comm: EFileApp\n[ 66.575439s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,7]Hardware name: HUAWEI HUAWEI QingYun\nPGUX-W515x-B081/SP1PANGUXM, BIOS 1.00.07 04/29/2024\n[ 66.575439s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,8]Call trace:\n[ 66.575469s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,9] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1c0\n[ 66.575469s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,0] show_stack+0x14/0x20\n[ 66.575469s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,1] dump_stack+0xd4/0x10c\n[ 66.575500s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,2] panic+0x1d8/0x3bc\n[ 66.575500s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,3] __stack_chk_fail+0x2c/0x38\n[ 66.575500s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,4] do_hardware_base_addr+0xcc/0xd0 [parport]", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": { "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e", "upstream_version": "6.1.47", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.1.103", "compiled_filter": false } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-42301" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/166a0bddcc27de41fe13f861c8348e8e53e988c8" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47b3dce100778001cd76f7e9188944b5cb27a76d" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a44f88f7576bc1916d8d6293f5c62fbe7cbe03e0" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c719b393374d3763e64900ee19aaed767d5a08d6" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f4da759092a1a6ce35fb085182d02de8cc4cc84" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b579ea3516c371ecf59d073772bc45dfd28c8a0e" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7789a1d6792af410aa9b39a1eb237ed24fa2170a" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab11dac93d2d568d151b1918d7b84c2d02bacbd5" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 7.8, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:L - The overflow is reached by a plain read() of /proc/sys/dev/parport/parportN/base-addr (or autoprobe*), which requires local access to the system. No network or physical interaction is needed for the confirmed trigger path.\nAC:L - On an affected system the attacker simply opens and reads a procfs file; the overflow is deterministic and requires no race, no memory-layout grooming, and no timing. The in-the-wild report shows a reproducible stack-protector panic from a single read.\nPR:L - All affected sysctl entries are mode 0444 under 0555 directories, so any unprivileged local account \u2014 including a sandboxed or \"nobody\" user \u2014 can read them. No capability, root, or namespace privilege is involved.\nUI:N - The attacker performs the read themselves; no victim action, mount, or configuration change by another user is required.\nS:U - The corruption is confined to the kernel stack of the calling task within the same security authority; no hypervisor, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - This is a stack buffer overflow past a 20-byte (and 256-byte) buffer that overwrites adjacent stack state including saved registers and the return address; in the do_autoprobe() variant the overflowing bytes are fully attacker-controlled Device ID data, giving corruption that can be leveraged into arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - An out-of-bounds stack write is an arbitrary-write primitive against the kernel stack, and via do_autoprobe() the written content is attacker-supplied and unbounded (~800+ bytes), making control-flow hijack and arbitrary kernel modification achievable.\nA:H - The reported real-world effect is \"Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in do_hardware_base_addr\", i.e. a full system crash that any local user can trigger on demand and repeatedly." } } }