{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-41069",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-41069"
  ],
  "published": "2024-07-29T14:58:20Z",
  "summary": "ASoC: topology: Fix references to freed memory",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: topology: Fix references to freed memory\n\nMost users after parsing a topology file, release memory used by it, so\nhaving pointer references directly into topology file contents is wrong.\nUse devm_kmemdup(), to allocate memory as needed.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.101",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-41069"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b188d7f3dfab10e332e3c1066e18857964a520d2"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab5a6208b4d6872b1c6ecea1867940fc668cc76d"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccae5c6a1fab9494c86b7856faf05e296c617702"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97ab304ecd95c0b1703ff8c8c3956dc6e2afe8e1"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The vulnerable code is the ASoC topology parser reached through local sound-card probe and subsequent local interaction with the DAPM graph via `/dev/snd/*` and driver bind/unbind; there is no network- or peer-supplied data path into `soc_tplg_dapm_graph_elems_load()`.\nAC:L - The dangling pointers are created unconditionally on every affected platform the moment `release_firmware()` runs after topology load \u2014 no race, no timing window, and no memory-layout precondition outside attacker influence, since the attacker can groom the freed vmalloc/kmalloc region with ordinary allocations before the stale pointers are used.\nPR:L - The freed-memory references are established automatically at boot with zero privilege, and an ordinary unprivileged local user with default `/dev/snd` access (granted to the console user by logind ACLs, or the `audio` group) can drive DAPM path re-evaluation and spray the freed pages; no root or capability is needed to reach the affected state.\nUI:N - Topology parsing and the subsequent `release_firmware()` happen automatically during sound-card initialization on affected Intel AVS/SOF and Qualcomm qdsp6 systems, with no action required from any victim user.\nS:U - The stale pointers, the freed firmware buffer, and any resulting corruption are all confined to the kernel of the same system; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Reads through the dangling `route->source/sink/control` pointers pull whatever kernel data has been reallocated into the freed firmware pages, and those bytes are used as widget/control names and printed via `dev_dbg`/`dev_err` in `sof_route_load()` and `snd_soc_dapm_add_route()`, disclosing arbitrary reallocated kernel memory.\nI:H - The stale pointers are also written through \u2014 Intel AVS did `strscpy((char *)route->source, buf, len)` on them (fixed in companion commit fd660b1bd015) \u2014 giving a write into memory that now belongs to some other kernel allocation, which is a classic use-after-free write primitive usable for control-flow hijacking.\nA:H - Dereferencing pointers into a released vmalloc'd firmware buffer produces a use-after-free that readily oopses or panics the kernel, and the follow-up \"ASoC: topology: Fix route memory corruption\" commit confirms real-world memory corruption in this exact code."
    }
  }
}