{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-36032",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-36032"
  ],
  "published": "2024-05-30T15:24:11Z",
  "summary": "Bluetooth: qca: fix info leak when fetching fw build id",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: qca: fix info leak when fetching fw build id\n\nAdd the missing sanity checks and move the 255-byte build-id buffer off\nthe stack to avoid leaking stack data through debugfs in case the\nbuild-info reply is malformed.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.91",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-36032"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62d5550ab62042dcceaf18844d0feadbb962cffe"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57062aa13e87b1a78a4a8f6cb5fab6ba24f5f488"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b63e0ef4d3ce0080395e5091fba2023f246c45a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a571044cc0a0c944e7c12237b6768aeedd7480e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cda0d6a198e2a7ec6f176c36173a57bdd8af7af2"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 8.1,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:A - The malformed build-info reply is supplied by the Bluetooth controller across the HCI/UART transport, so the attacker position is a rogue or over-the-air-compromised QCA BT SoC in Bluetooth radio range of the phone/embedded device \u2014 an adjacent-network attack surface, consistent with prior kernel-CNA scoring of HCI-transport-sourced data (CVE-2024-36968).\nAC:L - The controller deterministically chooses the event length and the length byte (e.g. a 3-byte reply with data[0]=254 for the slab overread, or data[0]=255 for the uninitialized-stack leak); there is no race, timing window, or memory-layout luck, and the path re-runs on every bring-up and subsystem restart.\nPR:N - qca_read_fw_build_info() runs unconditionally from hdev->setup during HCI device initialisation at boot/rfkill-unblock/SSR with no authentication and no host account required, and the resulting leak lands in a 0444-mode debugfs node rather than behind any credential check.\nUI:N - Bluetooth setup is performed automatically by the kernel when the HCI device is brought up; no victim action such as pairing, mounting, or opening a file is involved.\nS:U - Both the out-of-bounds reads and the disclosed data stay within the kernel's own memory and security authority, with no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary crossed.\nC:H - This is an out-of-bounds read of up to ~254 bytes of adjacent slab memory past the skb buffer plus an unbounded kernel-stack overread (vsnprintf \"%s\" over a never-initialised 255-byte stack buffer), repeatable on every controller reset and exfiltrated through debugfs \u2014 far beyond a small bounded read, and sufficient to recover kernel pointers and defeat KASLR.\nI:N - The defect is purely a read overrun; the leaked bytes are written into a correctly sized kvasprintf allocation, so no kernel data outside the driver's own fw_info string is modified.\nA:H - The unbounded string walk off the end of the 255-byte stack buffer can run into the VMAP_STACK guard page, and the slab overread can hit a KFENCE-guarded page, producing an oops during Bluetooth initialisation \u2014 a panic on the panic_on_oops/panic_on_warn configurations common in Android, automotive, and embedded deployments."
    }
  }
}