{ "schema_version": "1.6.1", "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-27053", "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z", "upstream": [ "CVE-2024-27053" ], "published": "2024-05-01T12:57:40Z", "summary": "wifi: wilc1000: fix RCU usage in connect path", "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: wilc1000: fix RCU usage in connect path\n\nWith lockdep enabled, calls to the connect function from cfg802.11 layer\nlead to the following warning:\n\n=============================\nWARNING: suspicious RCU usage\n6.7.0-rc1-wt+ #333 Not tainted\n-----------------------------\ndrivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/hif.c:386\nsuspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!\n[...]\nstack backtrace:\nCPU: 0 PID: 100 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 6.7.0-rc1-wt+ #333\nHardware name: Atmel SAMA5\n unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c\n show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48\n dump_stack_lvl from wilc_parse_join_bss_param+0x7dc/0x7f4\n wilc_parse_join_bss_param from connect+0x2c4/0x648\n connect from cfg80211_connect+0x30c/0xb74\n cfg80211_connect from nl80211_connect+0x860/0xa94\n nl80211_connect from genl_rcv_msg+0x3fc/0x59c\n genl_rcv_msg from netlink_rcv_skb+0xd0/0x1f8\n netlink_rcv_skb from genl_rcv+0x2c/0x3c\n genl_rcv from netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x550\n netlink_unicast from netlink_sendmsg+0x368/0x688\n netlink_sendmsg from ____sys_sendmsg+0x190/0x430\n ____sys_sendmsg from ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x158\n ___sys_sendmsg from sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x150\n sys_sendmsg from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c\n\nThis warning is emitted because in the connect path, when trying to parse\ntarget BSS parameters, we dereference a RCU pointer whithout being in RCU\ncritical section.\nFix RCU dereference usage by moving it to a RCU read critical section. To\navoid wrapping the whole wilc_parse_join_bss_param under the critical\nsection, just use the critical section to copy ies data", "severity": [ { "type": "CVSS_V3", "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" } ], "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12", "name": "linux" }, "versions": [ "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" ], "ecosystem_specific": { "binaries": [ { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" }, { "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8", "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4" } ] }, "database_specific": { "per_version": { "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": { "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e", "upstream_version": "6.1.47", "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)", "upstream_fixed": "6.1.83", "compiled_filter": false } } } } ], "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-27053" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e556006de4ea93abe2b46cba202a2556c544b8b2" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bbf38c350acb6500cbe667b1e2e68f896e4b38" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d80fc436751cfa6b02a8eda74eb6cce7dadfe5a2" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/745003b5917b610352f52fe0d11ef658d6471ec2" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bfd20d5f5c62b5495d6c0016ee6933bd3add7ce" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5800ec78775c0cd646f71eb9bf8402fb794807de" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd50d3ead6e3707bb0a5df7cc832730c93ace3a7" }, { "type": "FIX", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/205c50306acf58a335eb19fa84e40140f4fe814f" } ], "database_specific": { "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git", "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z", "severity": { "source": "kernel CNA", "cvss_v3_score": 8.8, "cvss_v3_severity": "High", "scenario": "AV:A - The freeing side of the race is driven purely by received 802.11 beacon/probe-response frames being folded into the cfg80211 BSS list, and the victim connect can be forced by injected deauthentication frames. Exploitation therefore requires only WiFi radio-range adjacency, matching the \"WiFi frame injection = Adjacent\" classification.\nAC:L - The attacker creates and controls both sides of the race \u2014 deauth injection forces wpa_supplicant to re-issue connect while a continuous beacon/probe-response flood churns bss->ies and issues kfree_rcu() \u2014 and the sequence can be retried indefinitely at high rate until the grace period lands inside the unprotected window.\nPR:N - The attacker needs no account, credentials, or network authentication on the target; the privileged NL80211_CMD_CONNECT is issued by the device's own supplicant as normal auto-reconnect behaviour, which the attacker merely induces from the air.\nUI:N - Reconnection after an injected deauth (and at boot/roam) is performed automatically by wpa_supplicant/NetworkManager with no human involvement.\nS:U - The use-after-free is confined to kernel memory within the same security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - This is a use-after-free read of a kernel heap object whose `int len` field then bounds subsequent IE scans, yielding an attacker-influenced out-of-bounds read; the recovered bytes are written into the join parameters sent to firmware and reflected in the association exchange, providing a kernel-memory disclosure channel.\nI:H - Use-after-free with attacker-groomed slab contents lets the attacker dictate the parsed offsets and the resulting join parameters (mode_802_11i, rsn_cap, p_suites, rates, NoA) programmed into the device, and UAF conditions are generally leverageable toward stronger corruption primitives.\nA:H - Parsing freed memory with a bogus/negative `ies->len` makes cfg80211_find_ie scan far outside the object, producing an oops or panic on unmapped memory, and the attacker can repeat the deauth/reconnect cycle to retrigger the crash at will." } } }