{
  "schema_version": "1.6.1",
  "id": "RPI-CVE-2024-26919",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T11:39:44Z",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-26919"
  ],
  "published": "2024-04-17T15:59:47Z",
  "summary": "usb: ulpi: Fix debugfs directory leak",
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: ulpi: Fix debugfs directory leak\n\nThe ULPI per-device debugfs root is named after the ulpi device's\nparent, but ulpi_unregister_interface tries to remove a debugfs\ndirectory named after the ulpi device itself. This results in the\ndirectory sticking around and preventing subsequent (deferred) probes\nfrom succeeding. Change the directory name to match the ulpi device.",
  "severity": [
    {
      "type": "CVSS_V3",
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
    }
  ],
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Raspberry Pi OS:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
      ],
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-2712",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v6",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v7l",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          },
          {
            "binary_name": "linux-image-6.1.0-rpi3-rpi-v8",
            "binary_version": "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "database_specific": {
        "per_version": {
          "1:6.1.47-1+rpt4": {
            "linux_commit": "655fc658a15ae7a6f37103754adb39ba52a9a14e",
            "upstream_version": "6.1.47",
            "assessment": "commit ancestry (strak rule)",
            "upstream_fixed": "6.1.79",
            "compiled_filter": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-26919"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d31b886ed6a5095214062ee4fb55037eb930adb6"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/330d22aba17a4d30a56f007d0f51291d7e00862b"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33713945cc92ea9c4a1a9479d5c1b7acb7fc4df3"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3caf2b2ad7334ef35f55b95f3e1b138c6f77b368"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "source": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git",
    "upstream_modified": "2026-08-05T11:52:36Z",
    "severity": {
      "source": "kernel CNA",
      "cvss_v3_score": 7.8,
      "cvss_v3_severity": "High",
      "scenario": "AV:L - The use-after-free is triggered by a local read of `/sys/kernel/debug/ulpi/<parent>/regs`, a local filesystem operation on the affected host. No network protocol or physical device insertion is involved \u2014 the ULPI PHY is an on-board SoC component, not a hot-pluggable peripheral.\nAC:L - The stale debugfs entry is created deterministically by any deferred probe or driver unbind (`goto ulpi_exit` in `ci_hdrc_probe`), and every subsequent read reliably dereferences the freed `struct ulpi` and indirect-calls `ulpi->ops->read`. The attacker fully controls when the read happens, so heap grooming between the `kfree()` and the read is entirely within their control \u2014 no condition depends on external state.\nPR:L - The kernel itself publishes the leaked directory as 0755 and the `regs` file as 0444, so any local user who can traverse the debugfs mount can trigger the UAF; on the ULPI-bearing platforms that matter (Android handsets, automotive/industrial chipidea and dwc3 boards) debugfs is commonly mounted with relaxed mode or group access for diagnostics daemons. No capability, namespace privilege, or kernel-enforced access check guards the vulnerable file.\nUI:N - The attacker performs the read themselves; no victim action is required. The dangling pointer arises automatically from normal deferred-probe behavior at boot.\nS:U - The freed object, the corrupted heap, and the hijackable indirect call all live within the kernel's own security authority. There is no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary crossed.\nC:H - This is a use-after-free on a ~1KB slab object; reclaiming the freed `struct ulpi` with attacker-shaped data and reading `regs` turns `ulpi->ops->read` into a controlled call, which is a general kernel-memory disclosure primitive. Even without grooming, the file dumps values derived from freed kernel heap contents.\nI:H - `ulpi_read()` loads a function pointer out of freed memory and indirect-calls it (21 times per read of `regs`), giving direct control-flow hijack once the slab slot is reclaimed \u2014 a full arbitrary-write/code-execution primitive, not just corruption.\nA:H - Dereferencing the freed `struct ulpi` and calling through a garbage `ops` pointer oopses or panics the kernel, and the stale entry can be read repeatedly. Per kernel scoring guidance any use-after-free is High availability impact."
    }
  }
}